Muḥammad Hijāb, the Falāsifah, Mutafalsifah and Jahmiyyah: Laying the Foundations for the Dīn of the Philosophers and Jahmites
Part 1: The Tawḥīḍ of Ibn Sīnā and the Misguided Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

INTRODUCTION

Six years ago, we wrote a series of articles advising Muslims about the danger of daʿwah personalities and organisations who engage in polemics with non-Muslims and Atheists while relying upon the polemics of the **Hellenized Sabeans, Jews, Christians** and those who followed their way from the Jahmiyyah, Muʿtazilah and their various offshoots.[1] These are "faulty goods" and anyone using them will bring harm upon Islām and Muslims in the long term. This is precisely what happened when the conceptual baggage of those Hellenized Sabeans, Jews and Christians entered the Muslims at the hands of **al-Jaʿd bin Dirham** and **al-Jahm bin Ṣafwān** during the early part of the second century hijrah. This led to trials and tribulations and the institutionalisation of doctrines and schools of

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[1] Refer to the series titled: "Advice Regarding Hamza Tzortzis and Company (iERA)" and the article, "Abu Taymiyyah Jeylani's Student and the Principle of Jahm bin Safwaan" on Aqidah.Com.

thought which became the direct causes of splitting and weakening of the Muslim nation, in addition to that already caused by the Khārijites, Shīʿites, Qadarites and Murjiʾītes in the first century hijrah.

It is evident that those who fall into these very serious errors do not have firm grounding in the creed of the Salaf, that their nurturing is one of philosophy, and that such a nurturing is inevitably going to come through in their polemics—in the course of which dangerous principles and statements will be made—and which the common people will think to be truth, when they are great misguidance.

From such personalities who are ignorant of the creed of the Salaf—the creed of the Prophets and Messengers of Allāh (عَزَّوَجَلَّ), the creed which the Qurʾān came with and which the Prophet (صَلَّى ٱللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ) taught to his nation—is **Muḥammad Hijāb**. He is one of numerous personalities who have found in the tube and social media a means by which to bait Muslims who have love for Islām and love for its dissemination but who are uninformed and unable to recognize the many errors, some of them very serious, that personalities like Hijāb fall into. Then, when their errors are pointed out—because the emotional attachment to them is very strong, and because all that the common person sees is apparent good from these personalities—it becomes difficult for such people to accept any criticism of these serious errors. This is more so when personalities like Hijāb take to the tube and social media in order to play with the minds of their audiences to attack, belittle and demonise those who adhere to the way of the Salaf and who make note of their harmful errors, doing so out of sincerity of purpose (naṣīḥah) to the common Muslims, as was commanded in the ḥadīth of Tamīm al-Dārī (رَضِيَ ٱللَّهُ عَنْهُ).

With this said, let us proceed to the issue at hand.

PART 1: THE DĪN OF THE PHILOSOPHERS, JAHMITES AND MUʻTAZILITES

In his debate with Edward Tabash, Hijāb, using the argument of Ibn Sīna (d. 429H), "the third teacher", that of **imkān and wujūb** (possible and necessary existence), he says:

"...You must conclude that what is required in order for any existence to exist is an independent thing, that is one, that is always in existence. Why? Because if it wasn't in existence, if it could be conceived that this thing is not in existence, it wouldn't be necessary. So it has to be eternal. And it cannot be made up of parts. Why? Because anything which is a compound is generated. Anything that's made up of parts, is dependent on those parts. That's point number one. And point number two, if it is was a possible existence, if it's made up of parts, you can imagine those parts being arranged in a different way. Therefore, it falls into the category of possible existence. To summarise: You require an independent thing outside

of the series of dependent things in order for any existence to exist. This thing must be one, it cannot have parts, it must be immaterial, incorporeal... it must be eternal. Now, this is what the Qūrʾān says in this basic definition of God...” Then Hijāb cites **Sūrah al-Ikhlāṣ**, ascribing this definition to the Qurʾān. In other words, this definition he has just explained, is the one that Allāh revealed in this chapter of the Qurʾān, allegedly. Then he says, with respect to the last verse, “He is immaterial, He is not composed of parts, he is incorporeal...”

COMMENTS

1. The speech you have just read above, dear respected reader, is the speech of one who is ignorant of what relates to **the difference** between **the language of the dīn of the Prophets and Messengers** and **the language of the dīn of the Falāsifah and Mutafalsifah**. Rather, this speech is one who is confused, one who is **a victim** of the cunning plots and designs of that shrewd kāfir, that Bāṭinī known as **Ibn Sīnā** (d. 429H), who in his shrewdness, tried to game the Mutakallimīn by seeking to corrupt their proof of **ḥudūth al-ajsām** (origination of bodies) and to inject the negation of Allāh’s attributes into the proof for Allāh’s existence. To this end, he copied and modified their proof by replacing the terms of muḥdath (originated) and muḥdith (originator)[2] to mumkin (possible) and wājib (necessary).[3] Then from this starting point, he injected the negation

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[2] The Mutakallimīn worked around this issue of what is ḥādith (originated) requiring a muḥdith (originator), which is sound in and of itself. However, in the demonstration of their proof, in demonstratiing that something is ḥādith, or muḥdath (originated) they entered false principles and statements, and ended up with faulty goods. This then led them to deny, to varying degrees, the names, attributes and actions of Allāh, in order to remain consistent with the proof.

[3] This does not mean that the proof itself is unsound and wrong. However, this argument was used to lay down the foundations for the negation of the attributes,

of the attributes by completing the argument with the addition of **tarkīb** (composition) and **takhṣīṣ** (specification). Thus, by proving Allāh's existence in this way, it can then be said that Allāh is not a body and is devoid of attributes, because anything that possesses attributes is composed (murakkab), having parts, and what is composed can only have a possible existence, and anything that is specified (mukhaṣṣaṣ), then it can only have a possible existence. Hence, there is something called wājib al-wujūd (one whose existence is necessary) and this requires that it is not a body and is devoid of all attributes. So this was the line of reasoning.

What Muḥammad Hijāb has presented here, in the name of daʿwah, is the language of the dīn of the Falāsifah and Mutafalsifah, and they are **Aristotle** (d. 332BC) who is known as "the First Teacher", **Abu Nasr al-Farābi** (d. 339H) who is known as "the Second Teacher", and **Ibn Sīnā** (d. 429H) is known as "the Third Teacher", and he is an enemy to the Prophets and Messengers. They established a "first cause" or a "prime mover" or a "necessarily existent" and then proceeded to describe this entity in such ways that rendered it non-existent, existing only in the mind as an abstraction. The argument that Muḥammad Hijāb has used is from Ibn Sīnā, and this argument was used to combat the Mutakallimīn. The significance of this will be made clear in the next point, when we understand the positioning of each faction in this debate.

2. The Mutakallimīn, Ahl al-Kalām—Jahmiyyah, Muʿtazilah, Kullābiyyah, Karrāmiyyah, Ashʿariyyah, Māturidiyyah—they all tried to use the conceptual baggage of Greek philosophy to prove Allāh's existence so that through it, they could validate the Qurʾān as revelation, the Prophet (ﷺ) as truthful and the resurrection as

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and this was done by augmenting this proof with those of tarkīb (composition) and takhṣīṣ (specification).

plausible and possible. Basically, their approach was to use the accepted science and philosophy of the day to beat the scientists and philosophers at their own game. However, this approach opposed what the Prophets and Messengers came with, and they ended up with faulty goods which forced them to negate Allāh's names, attributes and actions in order to remain consistent with the proof they had formulated. As they were busy refining this proof in the 4th and 5th centuries, the likes of Ibn Sīnā (d. 429H) appeared, and being very shrewd, they saw through the flaw in this proof, and did their best to try and undermine it in numerous ways. This is because they believed in the eternity of the universe and were trying to prove that the universe is "mūjab bil-dhāt", meaning, it was necessitated by Allāh's existence. So long as Allāh exists, the universe exists, they are contemporaneous, and Allāh is not a body and is devoid of attributes and does not have matter and form, keeping in line with Aristotelian and Platonic conceptual baggage. So when they were able to justify the negation of all of the attributes through the arguments of tarkīb and takhṣīṣ which were extensions of the argument of imkān and wujūb— aiming to undermine the proof used by the Mutakallimīn in all of this—they could then also say to the Mutakallimīn who were arguing for the origination of the universe:

"We all agree upon making taʾwīl of the revealed texts that mention Allāh's attributes (which all of us have undermined in various ways). If this is the case, and given that the subject of Allāh's attributes and His Oneness[4] is greater than the subject of Allāh's creation, then we, the Mutafalsifah, are even more justified in making taʾwīl of the texts that speak of Allāh 'creating the heavens and earth'. To us, they are figurative and metaphorical, just as the texts of the

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[4] Which to them lies in the negation of Allāh's attributes.

attributes, as we all agree, are figurative and metaphorical, to all parties. Thus, we have a greater justification for denying that there was a 'creation' and to assert that the universe has always been in existence. And just as you answer the People of the Sunnah when they affirm Allāh is 'above' His creation, that this aboveness is one of rank and status only, just like a gold coin is above a silver coin, then likewise, we say that Allāh was 'before' His creation from the point of view of status and rank only, not in actual reality."

So when Muḥammad Hijāb comes out with the argument of Ibn Sīnā of imkān and wujūb, possible and necessary existence, **and takes it through to its intended full logical conclusion and outcome, entering right into the description of the entity that is being proven**, then he is unknowingly standing on the side of the enemies of Allāh (عَزَّوَجَلَّ) and His Messenger (صَلَّىٱللَّهُعَلَيۡهِوَسَلَّمَ), on the opposite side of the Mutakallimīn—who were trying to defend Islām, the Qurʾān, Prophethood and Resurrection, even though they were misguided in their approach and used faulty goods—let alone standing on the opposite side of Ahl al-Sunnah, the followers of the Salaf. And this is the end result of the one who has not studied the creed of the Salaf, who has no grounding that in that, and who simply filled his belly with philosophy. It is inevitable that such a person will enter himself into compound ignorance and become bewildered, whilst thinking he is illuminated and some high powered intellectual.

3. Muḥammad Ḥijāb ascribed what he derived through the argument laid down by Ibn Sīnā (d. 439H) to the Book of Allāh, for he claimed that the definition of the creator he outlined, through the argument of Ibn Sīnā, is what Allāh revealed in Sūrah Ikhlāṣ. And for this Muḥammad Hijāb needs to recant and repent, because this is not the language of the Prophets and Messengers and nor of the Salaf. They did not arrive at their knowledge of Allāh through

philosophy, rather it was by way of revelation. It is revelation that makes knowledge of Allāh wājib, through revelation itself, and not throough reason, even though reason is a limited, deficient route to that end.

4. Just as we pointed out in the case of others who erred in this same way, it is not the case that people like Muḥammad Hijāb negate the attributes, rather they will have statements, perhaps in the very same lecture, whereby they affirm the attributes. What this shows is their confusion and lack of grounding. They are unable to realise the contradiction they are falling into, and how they are laying the foundations for, or perpetuating the very misguidance that al-Jaʿd bin Dirham and al-Jahm bin Ṣafwān brought into the ummah. Such misguidance that caused splits and divisions therein, as well as much turmoil. The introduction of bidʿah—particularly in doctrine—is the primary cause of the weakening and demise of this ummah and it is what brought the onslaught of the enemies, the **Mongols from the East** and the **Crusaders from the West**, as mentioned by Ibn Taymiyyah. To add to their utter confusion and bewilderment, you will see the likes of Muḥammad Hiijāb calling to an Ikhwānī manhaj of manufactured, fake, pretentious unity, whilst at the same time—as can be seen here—perpetuating the same root causes which led to the splitting of the ummah. This reveals the intellectual confusion that Muḥammad Hijāb is in.

You should know that **the tube and social media is a tremendous fitnah for Muslims** because it has allowed any person to come along, and, using a mixture of daʿwah and entertainment, to captivate the hearts of millions of common Muslims. Then, due to ignorance and desire, these personalities mislead those Muslims by failing to direct them to the creed and methodology of the Salaf, where true unity and rectification lies. Rather, they will often attack,

belittle and speak ill of the callers to that way, when they fear that the audiences they have nicely carved up for themselves might become well-informed and become aware that these personalities are not what they are acting out to be, and that what they are teaching is not knowledge but ignorance, not guidance but misguidance, albeit, all clothed as "education" and "debate". May Allāh guide these individuals to sincerity and truth, so that in turn, their audiences turn to right guidance, āmīn.

5. It is important to note that the Qurʾān and Sunnah have come with proofs (āyāt, barāhīn) to establish Allāh's existence with **an existence that is ʿaynī** (a proof that points to a specific, actual existing entity, in external reality, in a direct, indisputable manner) and they have come with proofs to establish that what the Messenger (ﷺ) brought of Īmān and Tawḥīd is the truth. Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jamāʿah adhere to these proofs, and thus there is no conflict and only complete coherence between the arguments they use and the Creator they subsequently describe and believe in. This is because there is nothing in the arguments they use, which if taken through to their full logical conclusions and eventual outcomes, that contradict the Creator described in the Qurʾān and the Sunnah. As for the method of the Philosophers and the Mutakallimīn, it is through the use of analogies and logic that do not establish an existence which is ʿaynī but only **muṭlaq** (absolute, non-specific, in the mind only). So when it is said by the Mutakallimūn, for example, that all bodies (ajsām) have incidental attributes (ʿaraḍ), and whatever has an incidental attribute could not have preceded it, and if it did not precede it, it must also be an event (ḥādith), and infinite events in the past are impossible and require one who brought them about, then what they have arrived at here is not a wujūd ʿaynī for a specific entity, but a wujūd muṭlaq through the application of logic from a

series of analogies. This opens the door for long-winded, philosophical debates, and also the injection of principles, that in turn render the proof to be such that it cannot be reconciled with the Creator described in the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, and requires a rejection of His attributes and actions if logical coherence and validity of the proof is to be maintained. And this is the nature of the arguments of the Mutafalsifah and the Mutakallimūn. In his argument above, Muḥammad Hijāb is not even standing with the Ṣifātīyyah (affirmers of the attributes) among the Mutakallimūn, but rather, with the Mutafalsifah, indicating the severity of his jahl in this topic.

Once this is clear, we present you with two useful and relevant extracts from our book, "The Creed of the Early Kullābī Ashʿarites"[5] in which the arguments of the Mutafalsifah and Mutakallimah are summarised and an important note is made about Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606H), who was somewhat of a chameleon. This will provide useful background information for what has preceded. After that, we will summarise the main points to be taken from this article.

FIRST EXCERPT FROM "THE CREED OF THE EARLY KULLÁBĪ ASHʿARITES"

The Proof of Ḥudūth al-Ajsām
The proof through origination of bodies. This was used by the Jahmiyyah, Muʿtazilah, Kullābiyyah, Karrāmiyyah, Ashʿariyyah and Māturidiyyah and has its roots with the Sabean

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[5] This 1,000 page book was authored in 2010 and is still due for publication. There are some important materials that need to be incorporated into the book, mostly from articles that were written on Asharis.Com after 2010 and hence the delay in its release. Some chapters of the book have already been published on Asharis.Com and we may serialise further chapters in due course, inshāʾAllāh.

philosophers. This proof argues by the presence of qualities (ṣifāt), incidental attributes (aʿrāḍ) and actions, events (ḥawādith) residing in the bodies (ajsām) prove that bodies themselves are events (ḥawādith) and because infinite events in the past are impossible, the universe, made up of bodies, is originated and has an originator.[6] This proof differs from the method of the Qurʾān in that the Qurʾān directs to observation and reflection upon the entities in the universe which subsequently indicate, in a direct manner, the existence of the creator who originated them, with a wujūd ʿaynī (an actual, real, true existence). However, the Mutakallimīn innovated into this and argued that it is because these entities have ṣifāt, aʿrāḍ and ḥawādith that they are originated and this is not the way of the Qurʾān. The Mutakallimīn acquired this method from the faction of Sabean philosophers who had not departed from the belief that the universe is created and used a corrupt method in

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[6] This posed a problem for the Mutakallimīn in that if Allāh spent a period in eternity and there was no creation, then on account of what was the creation created, what reason or cause brought it about at a specific point in time and what made it's existence possible after it was impossible. Allāh must have originated it by exercising something of His attributes such as speech, power, will, and if this is the case, then according to this proof, Allāh has been subject to an event in His essence, and therefore He must be a body that is originated. So when the Philosophers saw the corruption in this proof they said that the belief in the universe being eternal is more sound. This is upon our understanding that all of these deviants, the Philosophers and the Ahl al-Kalām, deny that Allāh has actions tied to His will and power, such that He does whatever He wills, whenever He wills, from eternity. This would actually solve the doubt of the eternity of the universe, but because the Mutakallimīn traversed this false, corrupt proof and opposed the Qurʾān and the Sunnah, they were unable to rebut the Philosophers coherently.

establishing this belief. [7] As a result they spoke about Allāh only in negations, what is referred to as negative theology. This is how ta'ṭīl entered the ummah, as has preceded, and through it, arose the ta'wīl claimed by the people of innovation, which is nothing but distortion.

When the Mutakallimīn laid down certain premises and assumptions as part of this method, such as whatever is not devoid of ḥawādīth (qualities, incidental attributes, occurrences) is itself ḥādith (an originated event),[8] and likewise, infinite events in the past are impossible,[9] they fell into great

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[7] The Jahmiyyah, Muʿtazilah and Ashʿariyyah all claim that the story of Ibrāhīm (عليه السلام) and his rejection of the sun, moon and stars as deities indicates their proof of ḥudūth al-ajsām is a Qurʾānic method. This is a false claim whose complete invalidation is within the story of Ibrāhīm (عليه السلام) itself. Ibrāhīm (عليه السلام) was not arguing for the existence of a creator, since he and his people already believed in the creator. He was arguing for the futility of worshipping the sun, moon and stars. This simple observation falsifies their claim, however there is also a detailed refutation of this matter and it is addressed later in the work. The Mutakallimīn took their proof from the descendants of those to whom Ibrāhīm (عليه السلام) was sent, and they are the Sabeans.

[8] Through this they denied Allāh's names, attributes and actions to varying degrees upon the differences between them, the Jahmiyyah, Muʿtazilah, Kullābiyyah, Ashʿariyyah, Māturīdiyyah.

[9] As they were forced to deny Allāh has actions tied to His will (mashīʾah) and power (qudrah) with the first premise, they created a problem for themselves with this second premise in that they denied the possibility that since Allāh has always been one who does what He wills, infinite events in the past are possible, not in the sense that any specific entity has an eternal existence alongside Allāh, but in the sense that the genus of events have never ceased to exist, because Allāh has always been one who does whatever He wills, even if each and every specific event from this genus of events is preceded by non-existence. Because they denied Allāh has actions tied to His will, the Philosophers were able to point out to

misguidance, and were effectively using weak, flawed and corrupt arguments in order to debate the atheists and heretics. When the Philosophers saw these weak and flawed proofs, they were led to believe in the truthfulness of their own belief that the universe is eternal and that it was not originated and brought into existence by a creator.

The Proof of Imkān and Wujūb

This is the proof through possible and necessary existence. It is the way used by the Philosophers, and was outlined by Ibn Sīnā (d. 429H).[10] In its foundation, it has been stolen from the way of the Mutakallimīn of *ḥudūth al-ajsām* which has preceded.[11] The Mutakallīmīn divided existence into recent (ḥādith) and eternal (qadīm), and the Mutafalsifah opposed this and divided it into possible (mumkin) and necessary (wājib). Just like the Mutakallimīn used what is recent, originated (muḥdath) to prove an originator (muḥdith), the Mutafalsifah used that whose existence is possible (mumkin) to indicate He whose existence is necessary (wājib). The reasoning is as follows: All existing things must either be obligatory in their existence, or only possible in their existence. If they are only possible in their existence, they must be in need of another existing thing for their existence. Thereafter, this thing they are in need of for their existence, is either external to it, or internal

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the Mutakallimīn that the proof of ḥudūth al-ajsām is flawed and that this only strengthens their argument that the matter of the universe is eternal.

[10] This is found in the books of Ibn Sīnā such as *al-Ishārāt*, *al-Najāh*, *al-Risālah al-Arshiyyah* and others.

[11] This is stated by Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah in one of his works, he explains that Ibn Sīnā simply altered the wordings of the proof to devise a proof for the purposes and designs of the Philosophers.

to it. It cannot be correct that this thing is internal to it, since it would make its existence necessary (wājib). It is therefore proven that what gave it its existence is external to it. Following on from this, all possible things must have an originator whose existence is obligatory since the existence of all possible things must have a cause that terminates at one whose existence is obligatory, otherwise it would mean infinite regression.[12] This proof outlined by Ibn Sīnā did not end here and flowed into another proof which is the proof of tarkīb.

The Proof of Tarkīb

The proof through composition. This proof was used by the Mutafalsifah, Jahmiyyah and Muʿtazilah.[13] It was used unscrupulously by later Ashʿarites such as al-Rāzī who employed it in his polemics against the followers of the revealed Books and sent Messengers, Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jamāʿah, the righteous Salaf, the people of ḥadīth and āthār.[14] This proof was articulated by Ibn Sīnā (d. 429H), following on from the proof of imkān and wujūb. After establishing He whose existence is wājib (obligatory, necessary), they said that the unique qualities of possible things are that they admit to existence, non-existence, composition (tarkīb), divisibility (inqisām, tajazzī,

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[12] This is because if one possible entity depended upon another possible entity for its existence, and then that entity likewise depended on another possible entity, it would mean infinite regression into the past and circular reasoning.

[13] The Muʿtazilah combined between the proof of ḥudūth al-ajsām and that of tarkīb, depending on them both in negating the attributes.

[14] He was followed in this action by the Ashʿarites who came after him and they used it to deny Allāh's ʿuluww and His ṣifāt khabariyyah such as face, hands, eyes. In this they abandoned the creed of Ibn Kullāb and al-Ashʿarī and the early Kullābī Ashʿarīs.

tabaʿʿuḍ), numerousness (kathrah). And this type of composition and its likes means that all possible things have need (iftiqār). Since Allāh is obligatory in His existence, He is free of need, and therefore He cannot be described with composition, divisiblity, numerousness and the likes. From here they outlined their understanding of the meaning of wāḥid (one), which is whatever is not composed (murakkab) and does not admit to divisibility.[15] And from here they devised their notion of Tawḥid which is purifying Allāh of composition, divisibility and numerousness.[16] What this translates to in reality, is the rejection of Allāh's names, attributes and actions, in agreement with the Jahmites. Their language became similar to the Mutakallimīn in that Tawḥid revolved around the negation of bodies (ajsām) and their attributes (ṣifāt, aʿrāḍ) from Allāh,

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[15] This is a false definition of the meaning of wāḥid. Refer to the section on tarkīb and oneness which addresses this doubt.

[16] Ibn Sīnā said, explaining this Tawḥid:

> Further, from what is known and clear is that the verified truth which is desirable to be referred back to regarding the soundness of Tawḥīd, of [which is the] affirmation of a Maker [who is] unique (*muwaḥḥad*) and sanctified (*muqaddas*) from: al-kam (quantity), al-kayf (quality), al-'ayn (location, place), matā (time, when), al-wadʿ (position), and al-taghyīr (change), [16] so that belief in Him becomes [one in which] He is a single essence, it not being possible for it [the essence] to have a partner in type (*nawʿ*) and nor that it has an existent part (*juzʿ*) whether in terms of quantity or conceptually (in meaning). And it is not possible that it [the essence] be outside of the universe or inside of it, and nor that it would be correct to point to Him that He is "here" or "there".

In his book *al-Risālah al-Aḍhawiyyah Fī Amr al-Maʿād* through Ibn al-Qayyim in *al-Sawāʾiq al-Mursalah* (taḥqīq, Dr. ʿAlī bin Muḥammad al-Dakhīl Allāh, Dār al-ʿĀṣimah, 1998, 3/1097-1099). Notice, that this language is no different to that of the Mutakallimīn, it essentially negates Aristotle's Categories from Allāh.

the Exalted.[17] The Philosophers argued that affirming attributes would require Allāh to be in need (muftaqir) so they said that the attributes are synonymous with Allāh's essence and not independent meanings that are established with Allāh's essence, in addition to Allāh's essence. They considered this to be tarkīb and they used this argument against those who affirmed the attributes.

As for the Mu'tazilah, they said that the *qadīm* (eternal) is not composed or divisible and as for the *ḥādith* (originated) then it admits to composition and divisibility. Therefore, multiplicity in attributes necessitates multiplicity in gods,[18] because these attributes must have a distinct eternal existence alongside Allāh, and this would render Allāh a body (jism), since only bodies are composed.

The Proof of Ikhtiṣāṣ
The proof through specification. The originator of this proof is Ibn Sīnā[19] and its foundations lie in concepts from the non-Muslim philosophers and the Mu'tazilah. It is similar to the proof of ḥudūth al-ajsām, and can be considered to be part of it, however it was given its own independent form by Ibn Sīnā. Ibn Sīnā's intent behind this proof was to corrupt the proof of the Mutakallimūn of *ḥudūth al-ajsām*. The basic principle outlined

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[17] Refer *to Dar' al-Taʿāruḍ al-ʿAql wal-Naql* (5/19).
[18] Refer to *Minhāj al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah* of Ibn Taymiyyah (2/130) and *Dar' al-Taʿāruḍ al-ʿAql wal-Naql* (5/46).
[19] It is outlined in his book *al-Ishārāt wal-Tanbīhāt*.

by Ibn Sīnā is that the state and condition of a thing[20] and its change from one moment to another necessitates the one who specified that state and condition or the changes in them. Therefore everything that is in need of a specifier (*mukhaṣṣiṣ*), is originated. Ibn Sīnā took the sound principle that the originated thing (*muḥdath*) must have an originator (*muḥdith*) into which the Mutakallimīn innovated what they innovated through the proof of ḥudūth al-ajsām, and he mixed it with the saying that that whose existence is possible (*mumkin*) must be in need of one that specifies that existence (*mukhaṣṣiṣ*) in terms of its tangible extent (*qadr*), form (*kaifiyyah*) attributes (*ṣifat*), place (*makān*) and direction (jihah). This proof laid down a foundation for negating Allāh's chosen actions (*ṣifāt fiʿliyyah*, *afʿāl ikhtiyāriyyah*). For this reason, the Ashʿarites[21] borrowed this proof from Ibn Sīnā in order to support their own negation of Allāh's ʿuluww and istiwā'. But the Ashʿarites generalized this and made the sign of something being originated and specified to be its possession of some measurable extent (*qadr*), anything which has dimension and bulk. Their intent behind this

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[20] Referring to the extent of a thing, its form and its attributes within a given place and direction. This is referred to as its specification.

[21] Abū Manṣūr al-Baghdādī (d. 429H) took this from Ibn Sīnā to whom he was a contemporary, refer to his book *Uṣūl al-Dīn* (p. 69). Likewise, al-Shahrastānī (d. 548H) used it in his book *Nihāyat al-Aqdām*. And likewise al-Ījī (d. 756H) used this proof in his book *al-Mawāqif*. Al-Ījī was followed in this by other Ashʿarites such as Muḥammad bin Yūsuf al-Sanūsī (d. 895H) in his books *Umm al-Barāhīn*, and *Sharh al-Sanūsiyyah al-Kubrā*. However, Sayf al-Dīn a-Āmidī (d. 631H) considered this proof to be weak, and he declared the foundation upon which it is based to be *bāṭīl* (false) in his book Abkār al-Afkār. Ibn Taymiyyah quoted al-Āmidī in the process of refuting this proof, indicating thereby that the Ashʿarites are not united and coherent, but disunited and incoherent in their foundations.

is to negate that Allāh is a body (*jism*) and has dimension.[22] In brief, this proof is false because it necessitates the rejection of a creator and He whose existence is obligatory, because Allāh has an essence that is described with specific attributes, and as such this enters into *ikhtiṣāṣ* (specification) according to the proof, and therefore, Allāh must have a *mukhaṣṣiṣ* (specifier) which is plain kufr and nothing but the whisperings of the devil.[23] The argument is false because it clashes with the Book and the Sunnah of affirmation of attributes.

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[22] In this view, the Ashʿarites distinguished between the existent reality (*qadr*) of a thing, in the sense it has a real tangible existence, and between its attributes (*ṣifāt*), whereas Ibn Sīnā included the existent reality of a thing, its form and its attributes as part of what indicates that it has been specified and therefore originated. So the Ashʿarites were led to say that everything which has a measurable extent is a body, however upon this proof, it is equally valid to say everything which has attributes is a body, since its possession of attributes shows it has been subject to specification, so it would refute their own affirmation of attributes for Allāh, and they would have to accept the argument of the Philosophers and Muʿtazilah against them in this regard. The Ashʿarites specified seven, or eight or nine attributes, and this is clear specification in Allāh's attributes, which would mean He is originated. In this matter those Ashʿarites who adopted this proof chose the path of contradiction and hypocrisy, and they only used this proof to help them deny Allāh's ʿuluww, and His istiwā'. So whilst they denied an existent reality (*qadr*) for Allāh's essence, claiming it would be specification (*ikhtiṣāṣ*), they affirmed it for the attributes. It appears that Ibn Sīnā's attempt to corrupt the proofs of the Mutakallimīn was effective. Refer to *Dar' al-Taʿāruḍ al-ʿAql wal-Naql* (3/355-357).

[23] This is the type of argument that enters into the saying of the Prophet (ﷺ):

> Satan comes to one of you and says, "Who created this." So he (the person) says, "Allāh?" Then he (Satan) says, "Who created Allāh?" So when one of you finds this, let him seek refuge in Allāh, and let him desist.

Reported by al-Bukhārī and Muslim. And the intent of Ibn Sīnā, who was a very shrewd kāfir, was to corrupt the proof of ḥudūth al-ajsām through this particular

Summary

The methods used by the Philosophers and Ahl al-Kalām, despite having some elements of truth, are deficient, comprise falsehood and point to the opposite of what they were intended to establish. On account of all of these proofs, that of *ḥudūth al-ajsām*, that of *tarkīb*, and that of *ikhtiṣāṣ*, the Philosophers and Mutakallimīn rejected Allāh's names, attributes and actions, showing their convergence and agreement on this matter in principle.

Further, the flawed and corrupt nature of these methods led these factions to be preoccupied with much falsehood until many of them became bewildered and confused after a lifetime of wastage in *kalām* and *falsafah*. The Ashʿarites borrowed the proofs of *tarkīb* and *ikhtiṣāṣ* from the likes of Ibn Sīnā in order to argue against Ahl al-Sunnah and against their affirmation of Allāh's ʿuluww and the ṣifāt khabariyyah,[24] indicating their hypocrisy and contradiction, making use of such proofs against Ahl al-Sunnah which also invalidate their own position of affirming some of the attributes.[25]

End of the first excerpt.

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proof, and to lead the Mutakallimīn into accepting it, whereby they would be forced to deny Allāh's attributes on account of it.

[24] As was done by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī in *Asās al-Taqdīs*.

[25] This explains the utter intellectual confusion and bewilderment found amongst the Ashʿarites in general. When doctrinal bigotry and partisanship is also present, it leads them to dishonesty and hypocrisy in discussion and debate.

SECOND EXCERPT: AL-RĀZI EMPLOYING THE PROOFS OF THE MUTAFALSIFAH IN ORDER TO REJECT ALLĀH'S ʿULUWW AND ṢIFAT KHABARIYYAH.[26]

As for Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606H), in his book *Asās al-Taqdīs*, he brought together all the texts from the Book and the Sunnah which are indicative of attributes, and which the earlier Ashʿarites affirmed, in order to explain that what is intended by them is other than their apparent meanings.[27] And in his other works, whilst acknowledging that Ibn Kullāb, al-Ashʿarī, al-Isfarāyīnī, and al-Bāqillānī affirm attributes other than the seven, he takes the position of withholding (*al-tawaqquf*), saying: "And justice (in this topic) is that there is no indication as to the affirmation of these attributes and nor to their negation, thus withholding is obligatory."[28]

This position is indicative his confusion on this subject, and those who came after al-Rāzī, were influenced by this orientation. It is also important to note at this point that al-Rāzī began to adopt the methods of the Philosophers such as Ibn Sīnā, and the Muʿtazilah to augment the methods of the Mutakallimīn in defining Tawḥīd. An example is the use of the proof of tarkīb (composition) to demonstrate Allāh's oneness (wahdah), in that everything created is composed, and thus in need (iftiqār), This proves that Allāh's is not composed, that His existence is unique, and that His existence is obligatory, and

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[26] Note that these words were written 9 years ago, and they address, very specifically, the same nonsense that Muḥammad Hijāb has brought.

[27] *Asās al-Taqdīs*, p. 97 onwards.

[28] *Muḥaṣṣal Afkār al-Mutaqaddimīn wal-Muta'akhkhirīn*, p. 187.

He is free of need. This evidence that al-Rāzī introduced into his works was used by the Philosophers to deny the attributes and was the basis of their understanding of Tawḥīd.[29] And while the Philosophers were using terms such as tarkīb (composition), inqisām (divisibility), kathrah (numerousness), iftiqār (need), juz' (part), ghayr (otherness) to deny all the

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[29] The notion of the Philosophers of Tawḥīd was that Allāh is one in the sense that He has no parts, and is indivisible from all aspects, such that He is not composed, there are no two meanings established with Him, there are no actions established with Him, there are not multiple definitions that can define Him and so on. They only affirmed an existence in the mind for Allāh, since what they reduced His existence to is one that can exist only in the mind, not in external reality. It was on this basis that they denied any names, attributes, and actions for Him, since this would mean that He is composed. Essentially, their understanding of Tawḥid, is nothing more than trying to conceive an idea of absolute, theoretical oneness in the mind. When the likes of al-Rāzī fell prey to these arguments of the Philosophers, and began to compile such rational evidences alongside those of the Mutakallimīn, thinking this would strengthen their theology, it led to others following this example, such as Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muhammad bin Maḥmūd al-ʿIjlī al-Aṣbaḥānī al-Ashʿarī (d. 688H) who mentioned only this proof in his short ʿaqīdah, and not that of ḥudūth al-ajsām. This saw the hybridization of kalām with falsafah beginning with the works of ar-Rāzī. For this reasons Muḥammad bin Yūsuf al-Sanūsī (d. 895H), a prominent Ashʿarī figurehead, indicated that his books are warned against. He wrote, speaking about al-Rāzī:

> And it could be plausible that the reason for his supplication with this is what he knew of his condition of craving to memorize the opinions of the Philosophers and the People of Desires and propagation of their doubts and his strengthening their citation alongside his weakness in determining the reply to many of them—based upon what is apparent from his authorship. And they pilfered him (won him over) in some beliefs, and he departed [from the way] (getting) close to their abominable desires. For this reason, the Shaykhs warn from looking into much of his authorship.

Refer to *Sharh al-Kubrā* of al-Sanūsī (Egypt, 1316H), pp. 22-23.

attributes for Allāh, arguing against the Mutakallimīn, the Ashʿarites under the influence of al-Rāzī began to employ these same terms to argue against the affirmations of Ahl al-Sunnah.[30] Both the Philosophers and the Muʿtazilah argued that describing Allāh with attributes that are additional to His essence necessitates that He is composed of parts, and that each part is needy and dependent (*muftaqir*) upon another. The later Ashʿariyyah (and the Māturīdīyyah) presumed the same in that if Allāh is described with the ṣifāt khabariyyah such as face, hands and their likes, this leads to Allāh being composed, necessitating need and dependence. They erred here because they were operating upon the principle of analogising the unseen with the seen, and thus they imagined that the reality (*kaifiyyah, ḥaqīqah*) of the attributes that Allāh affirmed for Himself, which are from the affairs of the unseen, are like the reality of the attributes of the creation which are perceived and observed. Then they fled from this tashbīh to taʿṭīl.

End of the second excerpt.

Based on all that has preceded, we can now make some concluding remarks.

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[30] Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī used the argument of tarkīb heavily in the book *Asās al-Taqdīs*, (ed. Aḥmad Hijāzi al-Saqā, Cairo, 1986) and likewise Saʿd al-Taftazānī, the Māturīdī Scholar, made use of this argument in *Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid* (taḥqīq Dr. ʿUmayrah, ʿAlam al-Kutub, 1998) 4/44.

CLOSING REMARKS

1. Muḥammad Hijāb presented the language of the deity of the Bāṭinī Ismāʿīlī Shīʿite known as Ibn Sīnā (d. 429H)—the necessarily existing being (wājib al-wujūd)—by reproducing his series of arguments that were designed to undermine and poison the argument used by the affirmers of the attributes, the Mutakallimūn, in particular those following the way of Ibn Kullāb (d. 240H), al-Ashʿarī (d. 324H) and al-Māturīdī (d. 333H). This diety is "immaterial, incorporeal"—which is the slogan innovated into Islām by al-Jahm bin Ṣafwān, that "Allāh is not a jism", and which was used to deny all the attributes. It is a diety that is not "composed of parts" which is the argument used by the Mutafalsifah and the Muʿtazilah to reject the attributes and by the Ashʿarites to reject the ṣifāt khabariyyah. Then he threw all of this innovation and misguidance upon the Qurʾān, the Speech of Allāh, upon one of the great sūrahs of the Qurʾān, al-Ikhlāṣ, in which the reality of Tawḥīd is explained.[31] Instead of the language of the Tawḥīd of the Messengers, he explained it through the language of the Tawḥīd of the Jahmiyyah and Mutafalsifah, from the misguided, wandering strayers, this same, false, futile Tawḥīd, which brought trials and turmoil to the ummah.

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[31] This sūrah is a refutation of those who ascribe offspring to Allāh from the People of the Book, the Pagans and the Philosophers who claim that Allāh has a son, or daughters or that entities emanate from Allāh such as the soul and intellect and so on, all of which is tawallud. This means the production of something, something emanating, having been born, arisen from something else. So this ṣūrah negates that Allāh separates and is divisible into deities, rather that He is only one. This angle is not the same angle that the Mutafalsifah and Mutakallimūn are coming from in their falsafah and kalām when they speak of divisibility, parts and so on and through which negation of the attributes is intended and an innovated philosophical Tawḥīd which clashes with the Qurʾān and the Sunnah.

2. With all of this, perhaps Muḥammad Ḥijāb will come along and protest that he affirms the attributes or try to find a way to reconcile affirmation of the attributes with his statements of falsehood, but that would be frivolous and would expose his dishonesty if he was to go in that direction. No doubt, Hijāb affirms the attributes, but what all of this shows that he is confused and bewildered, and has ignorance which is compound (jahl murakkab) in this subject matter.

3. It is obligatory upon Muḥammad Hijāb to repent and to clarify to his audience the falsehood that he has been promoting to them and its inherent danger in that it lays down the foundation for denying the actual Tawḥīd that the Messengers came with, which includes His names, attributes and actions.

4. And what emphasises the necessity of Muḥammad Ḥijāb repenting and clarifying is that even the Ashʿarites, as noted by al-Sanūsī (d. 895H), in what we have cited above, warned against al-Rāzī (d. 606H) because he entered into the sayings of the Mutafalsifah, became poisoned by them and incorporated their arguments—in essence, if not by name—which then corrupted and polluted the arguments of the Ṣifātiyyah among the Mutakallimīn. They warned against looking into his books because they were poison. Hence, this misguidance is so clear, that even the misguided Ashʿarīs warned from that which al-Rāzī fell into, and which Muḥammad Hijāb is reproducing for the ummah in the 21st century, through the tube and social media.

5. Abu Bakr al-Marwazī reported:I heard Abū ʿAbd Allāh [Imām Aḥmad] (d. 241H) (رَحِمَهُٱللَّٰه) saying: "Whoever takes to kalām will never prosper and whoever takes to kalām will not escape from tajahhum (adopting the ūsūl of the Jahmiyyah)."[32] Also from the censure of this

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[32] Ibn Baṭṭāh in *Kitāb al-Ibānah*, *Kitāb al-Īmān* (2/537).

particular kalām is the speech of Abū Yūsuf[33] (d. 182H) (رحمه الله) the companion of Abū Ḥanīfah, and from his statements: "Whoever sought his religion through *kalām* will fall into heresy."[34] And Ibn Abī Ḥātim said: "My father (Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī) and Abū Zurʻah (al-Rāzī) used to say, "Whoever sought religion with *kalām*, will go astray."[35]

This is Muḥammad Hijāb.

Imām Mālik (رحمه الله) said: "May Allāh curse ʻAmr [bin ʻUbayd], for he innovated these innovations of *kalām*. If *kalām* had been knowledge, the Companions and Successors would have spoken regarding it, just as they spoke about the rulings and legislative matters. However it is falsehood that directs to falsehood."[36]

This is what Muḥammad Hijāb is upon, falsehood.

May Allāh grant him tawfīq to make repentance and clarification and to cease misleading his audience.

Also, Muḥammad Hijāb mocked Salafīs for having deficiency in Arabic or Qurʾān recitation. There were among the Imāms of the Salaf, those who would make mistakes in these areas too. But to have mistakes in ʻaqīdah is worse, and this is greater and more blameworthy. It would be a great idea if he came to the Salafi Mosque in Birmingham to sit in the lessons of Tawḥīd, so he can learn to distinguish between the language of Tawḥīd of the Prophets and Messengers from the language of Tawḥid of the Mutafalsifah and Jahmiyyah.

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[33] He is al-Qāḍī Abū Yūsuf Yaʻqūb bin Ibrāhīm bin Ḥabīb al-Ansārī al-Kūfī, he was a scholar, jurist, muḥaddith.

[34] *Dhamm ul-Kalām wa Ahlihī* of Abu Ismāʻīl al-Harawī (4/210).

[35] Ibid, (4/383).

[36] *Sharh al-Sunnah* of al-Baghawī (d. 1/217), and see also *Fatāwā al-Miṣriyyah* of Ibn Taymiyyah (6/560).

Abu ʿIyaaḍ
@abuiyaadsp ◆ salaf.com
9 Shawwāl 1440 / 12 June 2019 v. 1.06