

Muḥammad Hijāb, the Falāsifah, Mutafalsifah and Jahmiyyah: Laying the Foundations for the Dīn of the Philosophers and Jahmites Part 2: Ibn al-Qayyim on the Way of the Philosophers in Theology



INTRODUCTION

In the first part of this series we discussed errors in **the language of Tawḥīd and its conception** with the people of kalām, the Mutakallimīn and the people of philosophy, the Mutafalsifah. This issue arose due to their use of arguments in which falsehood is mixed with elements of truth, and which in turn require them to use a **particular language** in describing the deity whose existence they establish through such methods—whether in affirmation or negation, **though particularly in negation**. We mentioned that the pioneers of this language were the likes of **al-Ja’d bin Dirham** and **al-Jahm bin Ṣafwān**, who innovated the statement, “Allāh is not body” as well as others. Their doctrines became foundations for the Mu’tazilah, Kullābiyyah, Karrāmiyyah, Ash’ariyyah and Mātūrīdiyyah who innovated a new understanding of Tawḥīd, other than the Tawḥīd of the Messengers, and brought great misguidance into the ummah. This type of terminology is the hallmark of those sects that the Salaf warned against very severely.

After them came the **Mutafalsifah**, such as **Ibn Sīnā** (d. 429H) and they tried to undermine and corrupt the proofs of the Mutakallimīn by also mixing truth with falsehood. All of them were in agreement in the philosophical language they used to describe the “muḥdith” or “wājib al-wujūd” that they established through abstract, philosophical reasoning.

The Salaf warned against the acquisition of creed in this manner because of their deep knowledge of where this type of theology leads if one remains true to its logical necessities and requirements, and if one employs its dubious and ambiguous terminology which comprises truth and falsehood. It leads to the gradual erosion of Allāh’s names, attributes and actions, until you are left with a deity that exists only in the mind, not in external reality.

Muḥammad Hijāb is among numerous da‘wah personalities that have followed the way of the Mutafalsifah and Mutakallimīn such as Ibn Sīnā (d. 429H) and al-Rāzī (d. 606H) in arriving at a conception and description of a deity upon the use of innovated language, which in turn, sets down a path for misguidance.

The two heads of innovation, **al-Ja‘d bin Dirham** (d. 118H), **al-Jahm bin Ṣafwān** (d. 128H) were given to argumentation and disputation and they had meagre knowledge of the way of the Salaf. So they mixed and argued with Atheists, the Sumaniyyah, the Jews, the Christians, the Sabean philosophers and they utilised philosophy and arrived at a deity that they described as, “not a jism, does not have parts, is not composite...” and so on, from innovated, dubious language.

In this article, we address another one of Hijāb’s discussions in which he repeats the same speech as before, just to highlight that this is not isolated, but something routine and established with him, and which he has repeated many times over.

PART 2: IBN AL-QAYYIM ON THE WAY OF THE PHILOSOPHERS

After using the proof of imkān and wujūb (possible and necessary existence) to establish the existence of a necessary being, Hijāb goes on to describe this necessary being upon the language of the Mutafalsifāh and non-Şifātiyyah among the Mutakallimīn (Jahmiyyah, Muʿtazilah):



(10:00 onwards): “There must be a necessary existence which everything depends upon, and it depends upon nothing, it must be one, and it also must be unique. Do you know why it must be unique, one? Because had it had something, for example if it was a composite, if it was a configured entity of many different parts then it would depend upon its parts for its existence. For example, like yourself right, you are a human being I’m a human being I have many different limbs, and parts and without those limbs and parts I couldn’t exist. So in in essence I depend upon my parts to exist physically

right so it must be something which doesn't have any parts right....” and later (17:54), “...it cannot be material and I'll tell you why it cannot be natural it must be immaterial... logically it cannot be a material entity, I'll tell you why everything which is a material entity is a composite configuration and as we discuss, a composite configuration is dependent upon its constituent parts. If something is dependent upon its constituent parts to exist it must be dependent and if it's dependent it can't be necessary.”

COMMENTS

1. When Hijāb says “composite and configured entity”, he is bringing Ibn Sīnā's arguments of **tarkīb** (composition) and **takhṣīṣ** (specification, configuration) that were used as devices to undermine the Ṣifātiyyah, as part of a broad scheme to undermine their theology, which they in turn had built upon faulty goods. We already discussed this in Part 1 of this series. The Mutafalsifāh and the non-Ṣifātiyyah among the Mutakallimīn used these arguments to justify the rejection of Allāh's attributes. The Salaf considered all of this type of language as innovation and misguidance.

2. Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 751H) (رَحْمَةُ اللَّهِ) explains the reality:

“As for the Philosophers, they affirmed the Maker through the way of *tarkīb* (composition) which is that [created] bodies (*ajsām*) are composed (*murakkabah*) and anything that is composite is needy and dependent (*yaftaqir*) upon its parts (*ajzā'*), and everything that is needy (*muftaqir*) then its existence is only possible (*mumkin*, as opposed to necessary, *wājib*), and that whose existence is only possible (*mumkin*) must have an agent whose existence is necessary (*wājib*). And numerousness (*kathrah*) in the essence (*dhāt*) of that whose existence is necessary is impossible, since that necessitates its composition (*tarkīb*) and need (*iftiqār*), and this

contradicts its necessary existence. And this is the limit of their Tawḥīd, and through it did they affirm the Creator, according to their claim. It is known that this is the greatest of evidences for the negation of the Creator, for it negates His power (*qudrah*), will (*mashī'ah*), knowledge (*'ilm*) and life (*ḥayāt*). Because if these attributes were affirmed for Him, according to their claim, He would be composite (*murakkab*, composed of parts), and that which is composite is in need of other than it (*muftaqiran ilā ghayrihi*), and therefore, cannot be necessary (in existence) by itself. And in this doubt there is such deceit and fraud, and [the use of] generalized words and ambiguous meanings whose description will become very lengthy.”¹

3. It is known from the Imāms of the Salaf and those who made taḥqīq of the way of the Salaf such as Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim, that in **the arena of affirmation (ithbāt) and negation (nafi)**, Ahl al-Sunnah follow the method and language of the Qur’ān, wherein affirmation is specific and negation is general, ensuring that they do not speak about Allāh without knowledge. As for **the arena of refutation (radd)**, then the Imāms of Ahl al-Sunnah discussed the innovated terms in order to separate truth from falsehood, to establish correct meanings, and to refer to these meanings through their correct, legislated Sharī’ah terms and warned from the use of dubious words which are loaded with philosophical meanings that are other than their known meanings in the language.

4. Muḥammad Hijāb does not know the way of the Salaf, because as we said, he has filled his belly with books of philosophy, and thus **he has no tamyīz (discernment) in this area**. Thus, in the arena of affirmation and negation he uses the language of the Mutafalsifāh

¹ Refer to *Mukhtaṣar al-Ṣawā’iq* (2/365).

and the negators among the Mutakallimīn, which is built upon fraud and deception as indicated by Ibn al-Qayyim, **and Muḥammad Hijāb is none the wiser.**² And thus, he leaves his audience with shubuhāt and the use of such speech that can be used to validate the misguidance of the Mutafalsifāh and Mutakallimīn.

This is why knowledge should never be taken from those who have no familiarity with the madhhab of the Salaf, who have not studied their way, and who oppose their way in their speech and in their da‘wah, and in fact, from those who belittle it by making light of the books of the Salaf, as if knowledge and sophistication of intellect lie in philosophy, and ignorance, simplicity of intellect and wastage of time lie in the books of the Salaf.

Abu ‘Iyaad

@abuiyaadsp ♦ salaf.com

10 Shawwāl 1440 / 13 June 2019 v. 1.03

² It is important to note that we are not accusing Muḥammad Hijāb of being a denier of the attributes, or of validating the false conclusions of the Mutafalsifāh or Mutakallimīn, but we are highlighting his ignorance, his intellectual confusion, and the fact that he knows philosophy more than he knows the way of the Salaf, and hence, falls into mistakes and makes dangerous statements. And it is important for Muslims to know this, because this is the naṣīḥah (sincerity of purpose) that the Messenger of Allāh (صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ) commanded in his statement: “The religion is sincerity of purpose”, which he repeated three times. And this is to be shown to Allāh, His Book, His Messenger, to the leaders of the Muslims and to their common-folk, as occurs in the ḥadīth of Tamīm al-Dārī (رَضِيَ اللهُ عَنْهُ). And we desire for all Muslims that they are guided to the way of the Salaf so that the causes of weakness and division are diminished and genuine unity is brought about.