

Muḥammad Hijāb, the Falāsifah, Mutafalsifah and Jahmiyyah: Laying the Foundations for the Dīn of the Philosophers and Jahmites Part 7: An Argument That Proves Neither a Creator nor the Tawḥīd of the Messengers But Necessitates Rejection of the Attributes, and the Creator Himself



Introduction

In previous articles we cited **Ibn Taymiyyah** and **Ibn al-Qayyim** on the argument of **the pseudophilosophers**, such as the Bāṭinī Ismāʿīlī Shīʿite, Ibn Sīna. This argument establishes a **wujūd muṭlaq** (abstract, non-specific, in the mind) of something whose existence is said to be necessary (wājib al-wujūd)—meaning its existence does not need others. To this, atheists simply reply that the universe, as a whole, has a necessary existence, and that’s all that there is, even if internally, parts of it depend on others. In response, when this argument is taken to its completion through the concepts of **tarkīb** (composition) and **ikhtiṣāṣ** (specification), it requires rejection of the attributes and rejection of the Creator himself, and ultimately leads back to atheism on the basis of its dubious terminology.

These types of arguments for acquisition of creed and speaking about Allāh with certain negations, are all part of the **condemned and heretical falsafah and ‘ilm al-kalām** whose practitioners the Imāms of the Salaf declared as misguided who misguide others. This is because it forces one to speak about Allāh, His essence, His names and attributes without knowledge, **with dubious innovated language**, and with the refuse of past idol-worshipping nations. It lays the foundations for great misguidance and confusion.

Though this affair is very clear, and we have already spelled it out over previous articles in this series—and this would be apparent to any person who has familiarity with the works of the Salaf and the Imāms who came after them in creed—Muḥammad Hijāb has not taken heed and has instead resorted to scandalmongering in order to divert attention from the issues in which he has been criticised.

Further, he is claiming that anyone who rejects this argument he is employing **may be guilty of tajsīm**—and so here we have come full circle! **The very slander of the Mutafalsifah, Jahmiyyah and Mu’tazilah against the People of Tawḥīd and Sunnah!** When they thought that acquisition of knowledge of Allāh is nazāriyy—through the route of investigation, reason—instead of being fiṭriyy, ḍurūriyy, which is innate and necessary, and that the argument they devised was the only way Allāh’s existence can be established, they thought that whoever opposed it was a mujassim, mushabbih.

Further, all of these sects—because their foundations were the same—**they gravitated towards each other in alliance, against Ahl al-Sunnah.** These sects, despite their differences between themselves in their philosophy and kalām, united against Ahl al-Sunnah, displaying enmity to them, as Ibn al-Qayyim pointed out in his work, al-Ṣawā’iq al-Mursalāh, and they were led to this by the misguidance they shared with each other.

And this is what Muḥammad Hijāb is now doing, he is angry, and is venting his anger¹ because his falsafah has been refuted and shown to be opposed to the way of the Prophets and Messengers, the Companions and the Salaf. Muḥammad Hijāb is ignorant of the madhhab of the Salaf and his grounding is entirely in philosophy. It is inevitable that such people will fall into errors and consider what is misguidance to be truth and guidance.

So in this article we will continue elaborating on this issue in order to keep making things clearer and clearer until there do not remain any grounds for confusion, and so that the ḥujjah (proof) continues to be established until black is clear from white.

How to read what follows: First, we will cite **three statements** from Ibn Taymiyyah who covers the argument devised by Ibn Sīnā and which some of the Ash‘arites were influenced by and which Hijāb employs in his polemics with atheists. **You need to thoroughly understand these three statements.** We have added notes to summarise the essential points to be taken from them. After, this we will validate the truth of what Ibn Taymiyyah observed seven centuries ago by analysing some of the debates of Muḥammad Hijāb against atheists.

¹ Muḥammad Hijāb is a **sore loser**. He could not take being refuted by scholars for his Ikhwani ideas and principles and likewise, for being refuted for his errors in creed. So he has now embarked upon a **personal vendetta** and resorted to **scandalmongering** and attacking others on **personal grounds**. He is unable to answer with knowledge in the issues he has been criticised for in aqidah and manhaj. And this is where you start seeing the reality of these people, in that they claim unity, love and overlooking other people’s faults, yet they are the most vile of people in rushing to expose and refute in personal matters, when they have been rightfully and justly touched up for their errors in religion. It is all about saving face and pleasing the audience, and all of this attention-seeking behaviour will avail Hijāb nothing on the Day of Judgement.

1. THE ARGUMENT OF IBN SĪNĀ, EMPLOYED BY MUḤAMMAD HIJĀB, DOES NOT AFFIRM A CREATOR

Speaking about the argument of imkān and wujūb as outlined by Ibn Sīnā and the Mutafalsifah who said that existence is either possible or obligatory, and that whose existence is possible requires that whose existence is obligatory, and thus an obligatory existence has been established, Ibn Taymiyyah (رحمته الله) says:

“For this method—despite it being sound without a doubt²—its outcome however, is the affirmation of an obligatory existence³, **and**

² Meaning, that the basic reasoning in it is sound. To say that if something needs other things besides it to exist, and it can both exist and be absent, and as such its existence is only a possible existence. That all such things must require something whose existence is obligatory, and thus there must be an obligatory existence, meaning something that does not depend on others for its existence. So this is sound and it is no different to saying: That which is originated and comes to be after not being requires an originator, or that which is created requires a creator or that which is needy requires one that is free of need and so on. All of this is sound in and of itself. However, the argument only proves a wujūd muṭlaq (abstract, general, unqualified, non-specific) in the mind for the entity in question that is said to be of “necessary existence” and requires completion.

³ In other words, all this argument leads to is the conclusion that the existence of some thing or another, must be obligatory, it must always have existed. And there is no evidence in this argument of a creator, nor of an act of creation having taken place by any agent. In fact, there is nothing in this argument that disproves that the universe is obligatory in its existence. For this reason, the pseudophilosophers had to augment this method with others, such as the argument of tarkīb and takhṣiṣ, in order to make this thing that is obligatory in its existence to be other than the universe itself. However, they used flawed, corrupt arguments which actually lead to the rejection of a creator, and proved the very opposite of what they set out to do, something that they perhaps did not realise. And this is the soft drink that Muḥammad Hijāb has been drinking in his philosophy, or the pasture in which he has been grazing and which he is packaging together as his intellectual goods, and then entertaining his audience therewith.

this has not been disputed by any of the intelligent people whose [views are] given consideration. Nor is it from the lofty objectives [in matters of creed], and nor does it establish the Creator, and nor does it establish an obligatory existence that originated the heavens and the earth—this being the way traversed by the theologians among the Islāmic Philosophers who followed the Greek Philosophers such as Aristotle and his peripatetic⁴ followers... All that this [argument] comprises is that within existence, there is an existence that is obligatory. And this is accepted by those who deny a Maker, such as Fir'aun, and the pure atheists such as the Philosophers, the [Bāṭinī] Qarāmites and their likes. And they say: ‘This existence is obligatory in its existence by itself.’⁵ And the statement of the people of the unity [of existence]—those who say that existence is one⁶—also leads to this outcome, for they say, at the end of the affair: ‘There is nothing that exists separate from the heavens and earth, and there is nothing except the existence of the possible existence.’

And the author of the creed affirmed a Maker through this method... but this method which he followed necessitates [only] the affirmation of an obligatory existence, and this is the method of Ibn

⁴ This is just a term used to describe his followers, it means “walking” and his followers would walk to the grounds where they would meet with Aristotle and be taught by him.

⁵ This would mean that matter is eternal and this universe has always been in existence. And note that when this argument is used, this is exactly what atheists will say. They will say we agree there is a necessary existence, and this to us, is the universe as a whole, as that is all there is and will ever be, and it needs nothing outside of it to exist.

⁶ Meaning, that there is no distinction between creator and created, that all of existence is one, and they consider this to be Tawḥīd, whereas it is in fact atheism.

Sīnā and whoever followed him. For they corroborate [their views] in Tawḥīd using their method by explaining the possibility of bodies [imkān al-ajsām]. It is then necessitated from that, that the obligatory [in existence] must be different to them [the bodies].⁷ And it is upon this method that he [al-Aṣbahānī] relied upon in Tawḥīd, as he will shortly mention. However, it is a weak method as we shall explain, if Allāh the Exalted wills. And there is no doubt that he summarised this creed from the books of Abū ‘Abd Allāh bin al-Khaṭīb al-Rāzī.”⁸ End of his speech.

Comments: From the above it becomes clear:

1. This argument does nothing except to affirm in one’s mind only that in existence there is **something** whose existence is obligatory.

2. This much is not under dispute by anybody, and it was the view of Fir‘aun, and of the pure atheists, and it is also what led to the doctrine of unity of existence (waḥdat al-wujūd) with the Ṣūfīs. Thus, this argument can admit that the universe is eternal and there is nothing in the argument itself to say otherwise. For this reason, this argument is of no use with atheists, and leads to wrangling and frivolous disputation. We shall illustrate this in the case of Muḥammad Hijāb later in this article inshā’Allāh.

3. Hence, this argument does not prove a Creator, or that any act of creation by an agent took place. As a result, something additional must be used to complete this argument. However the additional arguments used are flawed and necessitate the rejection of a creator and the saying of an eternal universe.

⁷ And this is what led them to reject the attributes, in that they had to speak of Allāh as being “different to bodies” instead of speaking about Allāh with the language that came in the Book and the Sunnah.

⁸ Sharḥ al-Aṣbahāniyyah (1430H) pp. 49-50.

Completing the Above Argument Through Tarkīb and Ikhtiṣāṣ

Given what has preceded, this argument is deficient until it is augmented and completed, and this was done by Ibn Sīnā with two methods, that of **tarkīb** (composition) and that of **ikhtiṣāṣ** (specification).

As for **tarkīb**, then it is to argue that since bodies which we see in the universe are composed and consist of parts and are therefore dependent on their parts for their existence, indicating they are in need, then the one who is obligatory in existence must be other than this, hence, He is one. And this became the basis for their Tawḥīd, and within this is a rejection of the attributes. Ibn Sīnā took this argument from the Mūʿtazilah and added it to this proof of imkān and wujūb.

As for **ikhtiṣāṣ**, then it is to argue that bodies have a specific, particular existence, that distinguish them from other bodies, in terms of their existent reality (qadr) and attribute (ṣifah), and hence, they require a specifier (mukhaṣṣiṣ) to give them that particular specification. This in turn means that the mukhaṣṣiṣ (specifier)—who is then to be identified as Allāh, the Creator—must not be specified and does not have a mukhaṣṣiṣ. This is detailed next.

2. A FLAWED ARGUMENT LEADING TO THE REJECTION OF A CREATOR

Ibn Taymiyyah shows the flaw in this argument. He said:

“It is possible for it to be said: Every existing thing has a reality (ḥaqīqah) which is specific to it, by which it is distinguished from other things besides it. Thus, it having this specific reality as opposed to other realities besides it, requires a specifier (mukhaṣṣiṣ). It can also be said: Every existing thing has necessary attributes that are

specific to it, and it being specified by those attributes as opposed to others is in need of a specifier (mukhaṣṣiṣ).

From what is known is that it has become known by necessity of reason and by agreement of intelligent people that there must be an eternal entity whose existence is obligatory by itself, and [also an] originated, possible existence. Because we see the emergence of entities, and what is emergent (ḥādith) has to be possible (mumkin), otherwise it would not have existed. And it cannot be obligatory [in its existence] by itself, otherwise it would not have been absent. And it is known by necessity that the nature (ṭabī'ah) of that which is originated (muḥdath) cannot be except through an eternal being. And the nature of what is possible cannot be except through what is obligatory (in its existence), as has been explained in other than this place. So when all existing things are divided into eternal (qadīm) and originated (muḥdath), and obligatory (wājib) and possible (mumkin), then it is also known that [all of these categories of beings] share with each other in having **existence** and **quiddity**⁹, and **essence** and **reality**.¹⁰ And what is obligatory (in its existence) is distinguished (from all other things) by what those things do not share with it. Rather, it is known by necessity that the obligatory (in existence) has a reality that is specific to it, nothing else shares with it in that reality.

Thus, if every specified thing requires a specifier that is separate from it, then the reality of that which is obligatory (in existence) by itself requires a specifier that is separate from

⁹ This refers to the thing or quality that makes something what it is.

¹⁰ In other words, all existing things, including the Creator, share with each other in possessing an essence which has its particular reality, alongside its attributes. This is shared between all existing things. And upon the argument, that which is obligatory or necessary in existence, which is the Creator, then it has a reality distinguished from other than it, and hence it is specified.

it.¹¹ Hence, there cannot be among all existing things, an entity that is eternal and nor obligatory. **As a result, [from this argument] it is binding that all emergent things arose without an originator, and that all possible things exist without one that is obligatory (in existence).**¹² And this—just as its corruption is known by necessity—then no intelligent person has adopted this view.¹³ Rather, the limit of what the disbelieving, negating atheist can say is: The universe is eternal, obligatory in its existence by itself. He does not say: ‘It is possible and originated and does not have an originator.’ ...

In summary, **every intelligent person is forced to affirm an existence that is obligatory in itself** and which has a reality that is specific to it that distinguishes it from what is besides it, without a specifier that is separate from it that specified it with that particular reality.”¹⁴ End of his speech.

And in this last paragraph, this existence can either be an unoriginated creator, or it can be an eternal universe. As such this argument does not distinguish between the statement of atheism and the statement of a Lord that created.

¹¹ So this is the flaw in the argument. This is because that which is obligatory in existence—which is identified as Allāh—has its own reality that is specific to it in terms of its existent reality and attributes, and through which it is distinguished from what is besides it and as such, since this is specification, it requires a specifier.

¹² Thus, the logical outcome of this argument is pure atheism and an eternal universe.

¹³ Meaning that the outcome of this argument is even worse than what the atheists say. This is because this argument says that all things that are only possible in their existence came to be **without requiring anything that is obligatory in its existence**. Whereas the atheists say the universe, as a whole, is obligatory in its existence, by itself, it has always been there.

¹⁴ Dar Ta’āruḍ al-‘Aql wal-Naql (3/361-362).

Comments:

1. All people must affirm this much that in all of existence there is **something** whose existence is obligatory, meaning, it does not depend on others besides it. And then they differ as to what this thing is. To the **atheist**, it is the universe, to a **believer** it is a creator, to the **people of the unity of existence doctrine**, it is the universe and creator merged as one.

2. As such, this argument achieves nothing except to affirm that in existence there is something that is of necessary existence, and that is it. Further, this affirmation is in the mind only and not in external reality, because this proof only establishes a wujūd muṭlaq (abstract, non-specific) for this necessary existence. For this reason, this argument had to be completed through additional arguments in order prove that it is a being, other than than the creation, and which is unlike the creation. It is here that the arguments of **tarkīb** (composition) or **ikhtiṣāṣ** (specification) were devised by Ibn Sīnā and both arguments comprise misguidance because they lead to rejection of the attributes of the creator and rejection of any act of creation, and rejection of the creator Himself.

3. It is this argument that Muḥammad Hijāb is using against atheists and which is flawed, and all he is doing is **setting up people for confusion and doubts in their religion**. And this is the nature of the people of falsafah and kalām, this has been proven historically, that such people are the ones most prone to doubts in their religion. And that is because they acquired it through faulty goods which the Salaf condemned.

4. According to this evidence of Ibn Sīnā and those who followed him in it—upon their principle that every specified, configured thing, requires a specifier that is separate from it—then the particular reality of that which is obligatory in existence (identified as Allāh) requires a

specifier, and in this is a negation of He whose existence is obligatory. This is because He has a reality that is unique and specific to Him, and through which He is distinguished from other existing things in terms of His existent reality and the attributes of that reality.

3. AN ARGUMENT THAT DOES NOT ESTABLISH A CREATOR EXCEPT WITH REJECTION OF THE ATTRIBUTES

Ibn Taymiyyah said:

“The Philosophers who speak of an eternal universe are of two types: The pure atheists, negators, those who say the universe is eternal, obligatory in its existence, and their statement is of the same category of that speech that Fir‘aun proclaimed... a rejection of the Lord of the Worlds... the corruption of their saying can be known either by necessity (ḍurūrah) or by reason (nadhar), from many angles...”

Then Ibn Taymiyyah outlines some basic arguments, that what we see of originated things coming in and out of existence require an originator that is knowing, wise and powerful. That dependent, needy things which we see around us, all of them require a being external to the sum of them. That what is possible, originated, needy, created requires what is obligatory, eternal, free of need, uncreated. He also explains that the affirmation of the existence of a creator is fiṭriyy (innate) and necessary (ḍurūriyy) in the view of the majority of intelligent people, though some people claimed that it is acquired by reflection and reason.

Then he continues:

“As for the followers of Aristotle who ascribed to Islām—such as Ibn Sīnā and his likes—then they affirm a ‘first cause’ through other than this method (of Aristotle), they called it ‘necessary existence’

(wājib al-wujūd)... saying: Existence is either necessary or possible. And what is possible requires what is obligatory (for it to exist), and thus, the affirmation of what is obligatory is binding, upon either of the two considerations. **Then they began to speak about the specific features of existence with speech that was composed of the sayings of their predecessors from the peripatetic philosophers (the students of Aristotle) and the speech of the Mu'tazilah in negation of the attributes.**¹⁵ They negated the attributes based upon the method of tarkīb (composition)¹⁶ and they called this knowledge, 'Divine Knowledge'. They also spoke about Prophethood and secrets of the [meanings of] verses and other speech that was not transmitted from their predecessors (the ancient philosophers, Aristotle and students). However, they took many statements from Muslim spectators and people of various creeds.

They desired to combine the foundations of their atheist predecessors and the statements of the people of religion among the Muslims, Jews and Christians. And many of the latecomers such as al-Rāzī, al-Āmidī and others made affirmation of the necessary existence (wājib al-wujūd) through this method (devised by Ibn Sīnā).

¹⁵ This is what Hijāb is doing when he uses dubious language like "finite, limited, composed, configured, particularised" and so on.

¹⁶ The Mu'tazilah argued that an essence with attributes necessitates composition, which would render Allāh to be like all the bodies (ajsām) that are in creation. Thus, they claimed that His attributes are synonymous with the essence, or are other than His essence. Thus either a) His mercy is the same as His will and both are the same as His essence, or b) that His mercy and will are simply the manifestations we see in creation, of acts of mercy, and of things taking place, indicating His will, though it is not an attribute of His essence, but external to it, something created. On this basis, they came to the conclusion that the Qur'ān is created. It is His speech, but not as an attribute of His essence, rather, it is similar to when it is said: "Allāh's Messenger", or "Allāh's House", or "Allāh's She-Camel" and so on.

And this method is not the method of the earlier people of kalām and their leading scholars. Just as it is not the method of the ancient Philosophers and their leading scholars. **And all it achieves is that about which there is no dispute between intelligent people, of the affirmation of the existence of that whose existence is necessary by itself. As for affirmation of the Maker of the universe, then this method does not achieve that, except upon the foundation of rejecting the attributes upon which they based their [version of] Tawḥīd. And this is a corrupt proof.**¹⁷
End of his speech.

Comments: From the above the following is noted:

1. This argument would not be objected to by Fir'aun and pure atheists as all people of intelligence are in agreement that there has to be something with a necessary existence. For this reason, it is pointless to argue this with atheists, as they are in agreement with it.

2. This method has been devised by Ibn Sīnā and his likes who desired to combine between the atheistic views of the ancient Philosophers and the theological views found among Muslims, Jews and Christians. As such, it comprises misguidance, Anyone who enters this field will become a caller to misguidance, and this because it is very obscure, where aspects of truth are bound to aspects of falsehood, through dubious terminology, with the end result being utter falsehood. So a person without discernment and with plenty of ego—such as Muḥammad Hijāb who is amazed with himself—then he will, in the absence of grounding in the creed of the Salaf, go astray and lead others astray, all the while thinking that he and his likes are upon guidance, and that they are educating

¹⁷ Sharḥ al-Aṣbahāniyyah (1430H) pp. 313-316.

Muslims, when in reality they are leading them to confusion and misguidance. This is how the likes of **al-Ja'd bin Dirham** and **al-Jahm bin Ṣafwān** were operating during the early first century hijrah. They were given to debating with philosophy, logic and rhetoric, not upon Sharī'ah knowledge. They thought that they were vanguards of Islām and that they were superior in intellect to others, and that rejection of their philosophy and their arguments, meant a rejection of Islām and the affirmation of a creator and of Tawḥīd and was equivalent to saying Allāh is a body, like all the bodies in the creation.

3. This method is a combination of various ideas taken from the Philosophers and the Mu'tazilah and what is like this can only be misguidance, and this is what Muḥammad Hijāb is promoting and using in his polemics.

What has preceded—if you have grasped it well—allows us to see the truth of what Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyyah pointed out, when we analyse a number of Hijāb's discussions. Muḥammad Hijāb is laying down the foundations for atheism, for the saying of Fir'aun and for the saying of the people of waḥdat ul-wujūd, all upon compound ignorance and upon amazement with himself and his philosophy, which is not knowledge but ignorance.

ILLUSTRATING ALL OF THE ABOVE

Let us illustrate this with a number of examples. When a person outlines a proof or an argument, we can fully grasp where he is coming from when he uses that very argument, or variations of it, in actual debates and discussions.

So everything Ibn Taymiyyah explained in his refutation of the heretics and misguided ones in what has preceded, will be proven to be true in what follows, inshā'Allāh.

1. THE 3 CLEVER ATHEISTS DISCUSSION

Hijāb is a **self-aggrandizer** in that he will title his videos to elevate and praise himself. So here, and this is one example of many, since he describes the three atheists as “clever”, it means that he must be cleverer than the three of them put together.¹⁸ However, one of the three atheists destroyed his argument **within the space of a minute** and Hijāb had to flee and then blag around for the next 20 minutes with sophistries and diversions. So let us proceed to the discussion.



Part: The discussion involves Hijāb making the claim: “**Anything with limited variables is dependent**”¹⁹, then one of the atheists ask him to explain that and Hijāb replies: “Limited variables means that it is not unlimited in its composition.” Then another atheist refers to a

¹⁸ This is how social media personalities operate. As they are competing with other personalities and performers for views and traffic, they have to resort to certain tactics in order in order to draw visitors, subscribers and traffic.

¹⁹ This is philosophical poison that paves the way for the rejection of a creator and the statement of the eternity of the universe.

finite number of atoms as his understanding of Hijāb’s statement, to which Hijāb replies vaguely, that he is not referring to atoms, “but a finite number of **whatever it may be...**” This is extremely vague and says nothing, it is evasion. Then Hijāb refers to the phone, to point out that it is finite in its nature. Then he gives an example of himself being composed of blood, flesh and so on, there being a finite number of variables that he is composed of, and then he says. **“What I am saying is that anything with such a description, which is finite in its composition, depends on something else in order for it to exist, that’s all I am saying.”** It is clear that Hijāb cannot escape from giving examples that are composed of atoms in order to illustrate what he means by “finite”, “limited” in “composition”. Straight away, one of the atheists says: **“So does God have infinite variables...”** and Hijāb quickly snaps: **“We are not talking about God”**, because here the atheist has already destroyed Hijāb’s futile argument with this simple question. And all of this is in the very first minute of the discussion. So Hijāb flees from answering that question by saying “We are not talking about God”, which then begs the question, what exactly are you proving and what exactly is the purpose of this whole discussion in the first place. Is it just a frivolous exercise through which you can demonstrate what a clever little philosopher you are? Or is there more to it? So within the first minute Hijāb has been cornered, and that is because he is using faulty goods and the innovated language of the philosophers.

Comments:

1. Allāh (عَزَّوَجَلَّ) does not occupy every place—unlike what the Ḥulūlī Jahmites claimed—and thus it cannot be said that His essence is “infinite”. Further, Allāh is eternal with all of His attributes, He does not acquire new attributes which He did not possess previously,

unlike what is claimed by the Ḥanafī Karrāmites. As such, Allāh would enter into Hijāb’s statement, “Anything with limited variables is dependent”, and this is what the atheist immediately picked upon.

2. Hijāb then illustrates what he means by “finite and limited variables” through the example of a phone and his own body. Here he is setting himself and his audience up for the validation of atheism, because every existing thing has a qadr (existent reality) and a şifah (a set of attributes) by which it is distinguished from other things besides it, and this includes Allāh (عَزَّوَجَلَّ).

3. When one of the atheists asked: “**So does God have infinite variables...**”, Hijāb’s argument was finished. This is because all things have an existent reality (qadr) which is a true and real existence in external reality, and which possesses a set of attributes referred to collectively as its attribute (şifah), and through this it is distinguished from those things besides it, because it has a specific existence which distinguishes it from other things.²⁰ This means that God, would enter into Hijāb’s statement, “Anything with limited variables is dependent” which is negation of a creator.

4. What Hijāb is doing here is giving his rendition of the proof that misguided heretic, that Bāṭinī Kāfir known as Ibn Sīnā, the proof of ikhtişāş (specification), which as Ibn Taymiyyah pointed out, leads to atheism and the saying that the universe is what is obligatory, or necessary in its existence, the saying of Fir’aun. As such no creator has been established and thus there is no difference between Hijāb and the atheists that there must be something whose existence is

²⁰ As for saying Allāh is infinite in His actions, then this is true and this can be found in the Qur’ān, for His words and His actions are infinite, never ending. And this is because He is eternal and He speaks and acts according to His will, and thus, there is no end to His speech and His action. But the speech here is not about this, and it is not what the atheist is referring to.

necessary, which to them is an eternal universe. And this is exactly what they will come to later in the discussion, proving that Hijāb is simply wasting his time and drawing his audience into misguidance.

Part: Hijāb then continues, “God is not finite, the definition of God is that He is infinite in His mercy, His knowledge etcetera, so He would be not in the category that we just described.” However, Hijāb here has changed the issue to the *ṣīfah* (attribute) and the atheist was not speaking about that. He was speaking about the *qadr* (existent reality). So the same atheist who raised the earlier question that made Hijāb flee and become evasive continues to say: “That tree is not God, so God cannot be infinite... if there is something that isn’t God, then God cannot be infinite.” Hijab responds to him: “Yeah, you’re right, exactly, something which isn’t God is finite.” Here, fleeing from the issue, Hijāb twisted the atheists statement the other way around, the atheist was saying “God cannot be infinite” and he was not speaking about what isn’t God, what is other than God.

So to avoid agreeing with the atheist and losing the argument, Hijab played a trick and reversed the statement, saying: “Yeah, you’re right, exactly, something which isn’t God is finite.” So the atheist is not satisfied knowing that he did not receive a proper answer, and continues to point out: “But if God isn’t the tree, He is finite.” Hijāb then asks: “No, but why would that be? Why is that the case? If God isn’t the tree, the tree is finite, so if He wasn’t the tree, why would that make Him finite.” The atheists objection is valid because he is essentially saying that God cannot be everywhere and in everything. Another of the atheists says: “God is everything apart from the tree...” Hijāb responds: “We didn’t say He is everything...” Hijāb then asks: “Are you saying that God occupies every crevice of creation? No, we do not believe that.”

This is something that the atheist presumed because Hijāb is saying that God is not finite and not limited, so the atheist took from this that God is unlimited and infinite in His essence. And this is understandable because Hijāb previously explained to the atheists what he meant by “finite, limited” by the examples of the phone and his own body. And all entities have a qadr (existent reality) as well as a set of attributes (ṣifah), so these things are not infinite in their qadr, their existent reality. So the atheist presumed upon Hijāb’s explanation that God is infinite. And this created confusion. So one atheist rightly said, that God is not the tree, and hence cannot be “infinite”, which Hijāb refuses to grant to him, even though it is true.

From here the discussion takes a detour because one of the atheists says that he does not understand all this “variable thing” and that this all seems to be just words. We can pause here and make some comments before continuing.

Comments:

1. Hijāb now has to play games of evasion and reframing because these atheists are raising questions which are natural to raise, and which show the futility and contradiction in the argument. If Hijāb is giving an example of a phone and his body (which refers to the qadr, the existent reality of a thing, what gives it its tangible existence) then God would have to be limited otherwise He would be in every place.

2. Hijāb said earlier that what is not unlimited in its composition, whatever is finite in its composition, **is dependent**. And He has not been able to exclude the creator from this. Allāh’s essence is “limited” in its qadr, because it is other than His creation, otherwise we would have the dīn of the Jahmites, that Allāh is everywhere, and this is why some of the Salaf, such as Ibn al-Mubārak and Imām Aḥmad (رَضِيَ اللهُ عَنْهُمَا) affirmed that Allāh is above His Throne with a ḥadd

(demarcation, limit). In other words, He is separate and distinct from His creation. And this is what the atheists are pointing out, and they are correct in this, and Hijāb is being evasive. So this path is the path of misguidance which leads to the negation of a creator, or merging the creator with the created and ending up with the doctrine of the unity of existence, which essentially, is atheism too. So the atheists have a valid point and Hijāb is unable to answer this except with evasion, diversion, reframing and other tricks dishonest philosophers play to avoid losing an argument.

3. Connected to the above, **Ibn Taymiyyah** said:

“And when the Jahmiyyah used to speak with such words whose meanings comprise the sense that the Creator is not distinguished (separate) from the creation, then they deny His attributes by which He is distinguished, and they deny his existent reality (qadr) such that when the Mu‘tazilah come to know that He is al-Hayy (Ever-Living), al-‘Alīm (All-Knowing), al-Qadīr (All-Powerful), they say, ‘We already know His reality (haqīqah) and His quiddity (māhiyah)’, and they say, ‘He is not separate and distinguished (bā’in) from those besides Him.’ In fact, either they should describe Him with the attribute of non-existence so that they say, ‘He is neither inside the world, not outside it and nor this and nor that’, or they should make Him merged with the created things or with the existence of the created things. So Ibn al-Mubārak explained that the Lord, free from all imperfections and the Most High, is upon His Throne, distinct from His creation, separate from them and he mentioned al-ḥadd—(what makes two things distinct and separate from each other, demarcates them)—because the Jahmiyyah used to say, ‘He has no ḥadd’, but whatever has no ḥadd is not separate and distinct from the creation and cannot be above the world because all of this is necessitated by (the meaning of) al- ḥadd. So when they asked Amīr ul-Mu‘minīn ‘Abd

Allāh ibn al-Mubāarak, ‘How should we know Him?’, he said, ‘That He is above His heavens, upon His Throne, separate and distinct from His creation’, then they mentioned the imperative of that which the Jahmiyyah denied, and by their denial of it, they also deny what it requires and necessitates—the (very) existence of He who is above the Throne, the Sublime, and His distinction and separation from the creation, so they said to him, ‘With a demarcation (bi ḥaddin)’, and he said, ‘With a demarcation, limit’. And this is something which is understood by everyone who knows what difference there is between the saying of the believers of Ahl us-Sunnah wal-Jamā’ah and the heretical Jahmites.”²¹

4. And **Ibn Abil-‘Izz al-Ḥanafī** wrote:

“And it is known that al-ḥadd is said regarding what a thing is separated from and distinguished by from what is besides it. And Allāh, the Exalted is not fused with [any of] His creation, and nor is His existence established with them, rather He is al-Qayyūm (Self-Sustaining), al-qā’imu bi nafsihī (established by His own self), one who sustains what is besides Him. Thus, it is not permitted that there should be any dispute regarding al-ḥadd with this meaning at all, since there is nothing behind its negation, except a negation of the existence of the Lord, and a negation of His reality.”²²

5. So the atheists were trying to point this out to Hijāb by their questions that came from their fiṭrah, despite them being atheists, “Is God the tree?”, and Hijāb simply played games with them, and was unable to distinguish the dīn of the Jahmites from the simple truth they were pointing out to him. And this is because, he would lose the argument, if he agreed with them. In fact, he already lost it, within the first minute as we already mentioned earlier. And this is the reality of

²¹ Naqd Ta’sīs al-Jahmiyyah (1/443 onwards).

²² Sharḥ al-‘Aqīdah al-Taḥāwīyyah (taḥqīq, al-Turkī and Arna’ūt), p. 263.

the philosophers, they end up being the most ignorant of people, despite claiming reason and intelligence.

Part: After the diversion from the main subject, one of the atheists comes back and says, returning to the prior discussion: “Going back... I agree that anything that has limited variables is dependent on something, unless we use this concept that we are all created from stardust...” Hijāb asks: “The universe has limited variables, is that accepted?” He continues to question: “Is the universe unlimited in its variables? The amount of stars that compose the universe, the amount of black holes that are in the universe, the amount of helium in the universe, is that limited or unlimited....We are talking about variables which are independent from time...” One of the atheists then explains his understanding that physical matter is finite because this matter is expanding out into empty space.²³

Hijāb says this is irrelevant, because if matter is expanding out and occupying empty space, then it must be finite in nature. Here he says: “Something which is infinite, cannot increase in number and size...” Then one of the atheists says, and pay attention to this: “Going back to the last step that we were at, I suppose an exception to that point is if something has always existed anyway, even if it is limited in its variables.” So here, the atheist is indicating the view that the universe is eternal and necessary by itself.

As we said before, the argument of Ibn Sīnā, all it can prove is that there is something in existence that is necessary by itself, that is it. It cannot differentiate between an eternal universe and a creator, unless it is augmented with other proofs and other lines of reasoning. However, those proofs in turn negate the existence of a creator, if not

²³ Upon the conjecture that the universe is expanding.

demand the negation of all of His attributes, rendering His existence one in the mind only and not in external reality. And this is the argument of being “limited in variables” or “having specification” and so on, which are essentially a combination of the arguments of tarkīb (composition) and ikhtiṣāṣ (specification) of Ibn Ṣīnā and involves dubious, ambiguous language.

Comments:

1. What we see above is illustration of Hijāb’s misguidance in following the flawed arguments of Bāṭinī Kāfir’s like Ibn Sīnā and whoever was deceived by him from the Mutakallimūn. If the universe is limited because its composition is limited and it is expanding (allegedly) into empty space, then the atheist who pointed out that God has to be limited as well has a valid point and to this Hijāb had no answer. This is why he fled on his heels at the very beginning when he said: “We are not talking about God”, submitting to defeat. Everything after this point is just evasion and diversion.

2. Then we come to what Ibn Taymiyyah pointed out, which is that the pure atheists assert that the universe has always existed, being necessary in its existence, by itself. In what follows the atheists will argue that the universe is obligatory in its existence by itself, even if internally, parts of it depend on each other.

Part: So a littler later Hijāb says to the atheists: “**My contention is exactly this: I am saying that it is not possible for something with limited variables to forever exist...**” and then qualifies himself, “... **and without being dependent...**” and he said this to allow himself to prevent the atheists from excluding the universe from this claim. However, the atheists will contend that the universe does not depend on anything outside of itself, and hence it is obligatory in

existence. So this much cannot be denied by anyone, and this was the statement of Fir‘aun and of the pure atheists in the past and the present.

Then Hijāb says: “In order for my contention to be disproved, you would have to give me a live example.” He says a little later: “My contention is that we have not yet found, in the history of the world, an example of something which is limited in its variables, yet independent.”²⁴ The same atheist (wearing the black hat) who asked the question earlier as to whether God has infinite variables, now answers Hijāb’s question and says: “The whole universe, as best we know”, meaning that the universe is limited in its variables and is independent. So Hijāb asks: “Can you prove it is independent?” The atheist responds by saying: “There is the theory that energy, that matter cannot be created or destroyed.”

So here, Hijāb is stuck and using sophistry and attempting to swindle the atheists, he says: “So you are saying that matter cannot be... that is within the circle of the universe, once again that would not apply.” And as Hijāb says this, he swiftly turns away from that

²⁴ Hijāb is asking for something which is impossible and this is because, if the universe is limited in its variables and dependent, then nothing can be found in it which is independent. So asking them with this standard of proof is trickery in argument because you know, by your own definition, they cannot provide it. And this is what happens, when you make philosophy to be the foundation of your polemics, honesty in argument can be lost very easily, without it having to be intentional, but rather, just due to the ambiguous nature of the terms and concepts being employed. Hence, what happens is that you appear to be winning an argument, but not because it has proceeded upon truth and honesty and with what agrees with the Book and the Sunnah upon the way of the Salaf. Rather, because of other considerations, and in the end, you have not established truth, nor refuted falsehood in the desired manner, even if your audience thinks you have, and thinks you are so clever and amazing and that you have defeated atheists, when you have done no such thing.

atheist and turns to another, hoping he has shaken this off, with a nervous look on his face and his tongue retreating. And this is not an answer, it is evasion. Because what the atheist said was that the universe could exist eternally and be independent in its whole. And this as we said, is agreed upon by all, including atheists, that there is something that whose existence is necessary, obligatory. To the atheist it is the universe, and to this Hijāb has no answer, except to use reasoning that in turn invalidates his entire argument and negates the existence of Allāh, leaving him to be in complete agreement with the atheists.

So Hijāb responds: “The context of what you said... would only work in the circuit of the universe.” Here Hijāb is actually affirming what the atheists said despite it being a non-answer to them and an attempt to confuse them. This is exactly what the atheists are saying, that the universe, in its own circuit, as a whole, within itself, even if parts of it depend on other parts, then it is independent and requires nothing outside of it, hence, it is necessary in existence. Then Hijāb says: “If the universe came into existence...” and the atheist interjects and says: “No one is saying it did come into existence.” So Hijāb asks: “So its always been there, in your mind.” And the atheist says: “Yes”, and another says: “That’s where the contention is.” Hijāb tried to shake this off with his tricks but he was unsuccessful.

Now Hijāb comes back to try and make a distinction between what the atheists consider to be eternal and independent in its whole (the universe) and what He is trying to prove to them, which is not even clear, because at the beginning he said, “**We are not talking about God**”, even though he is. However, he had to flee from that because he was unable to answer the question whether God has infinite variables. So, now he comes back in order to make the same false argument. He says: “Even if you say the universe has always been

there, you still have to recognise that the universe is composed of a limited amount of variables.” One atheist agrees with him and says: “Yes, I agree that the universe contains limited variables.” Getting this agreement, Hijāb then proceeds to develop the argument: “So if we go to the next stage now... if that is the case, if the universe is composed of limited variables, number one. Number two... sorry, number one, **that which is limited in its variables depends on something else...**” Then the atheist interjects and says: “No, no, we decided we did not agree with that.” The discussion then digresses for a couple of minutes, when Hijab asks them why they disagree with this. Let us summarise and comment here as there is something crucial here that you must understand, so that you can grasp the depths of Hijāb’s ignorance and misguidance.²⁵

Comments:

1. In the above part of the conversation, the atheists do not agree with Hijāb that whatever is limited in its variables depends on something else, and this is because they see the universe as an eternal entity that did not need anything outside of itself and which has always been there, even if within the universe, its parts depend on each other and are limited, finite. And this indicates the flawed nature of the argument, and Hijāb is unable to overcome it. This is because Allāh (ﷻ) has an existent reality that is not in every place, as well as attributes, and through them both, He is distinguished from His creation. As such, He cannot be infinite with His essence, otherwise He would be all that exists and this is not the case. And as for His attributes, then He cannot acquire any new attribute He never had before, because that would be deficiency. So He is perfect, with

²⁵ Then there is some diversion from this topic and some wrangling about induction and the discussion eventually moves into another direction about multiverses.

all His attributes. As such, Muḥammad Hġjāb cannot distinguish between an eternal universe, which the atheists do not accept is dependent, and between the Creator. Rather, his argument leads to the negation of the very creator he is trying to prove, in a somewhat crooked manner, because he is not being straight with those atheists either.

2. Allāh's attribute of mercy (raḥmah) and speech (kalām) depends on His desire (irādah), and His acts of creation depend on His will (mashī'ah), and thus some of His attributes depend on each other,²⁶ and given that, He is still eternal in His existence and not

²⁶ [Update 28/06/2019](#): Hijāb has criticised me for saying Allāh has attributes which depend on others. **Response**: The above speech of mine is a reference to Allāh's **ṣifāt fi'liyyah** or **ikhti'yāriyyah**, which is that Allāh exercising those attributes returns back to His will (mashī'ah) and desire (irādah), as is known. Before Allāh shows mercy, He desires to show it. Before Allāh speaks or creates, He desires to, and He creates with His power (qudrah). I can bring lots of statements to indicate this, for example, the statement of Allāh (**إِنَّمَا أَمْرُهُ إِذَا أَرَادَ شَيْئًا أَنْ يَقُولَ لَهُ كُنْ فَيَكُونُ**), **"Verily, His Command, when He desires a thing, is only that He says to it, "Be!" and it is!"** (36:82). So His speech (qawl) returns back to His irādah. And Ibn Taymiyyah (**رَحْمَةُ اللَّهِ**) said: "And these are the affairs that the Lord (**عَزَّ وَجَلَّ**) is described with and which are established with His essence **through His will and power**", and he mentions among them **speech** and **mercy**, and **"...creation is an act that occurred by His will...** So this shows that His actions are established with His essence, **alongside them happening by His will and power.**" Jāmi' al-Rasā'il (2/3,20). So Allāh's ṣifāt fi'liyyah, like the ones I mentioned, return back to other attributes, such as will and power. However, the above speech is being said in the course of the flow of the argument, which is that an atheist will come back and say, but does God not have attributes? And do not some of his attributes depend on others? And do not His attributes depend on His essence? And are they other than the essence? So by using this innovated language, you will be unable to distinguish the creator from the atheist's eternal, necessary universe, except by denying realities that are indicated in the Qur'ān and the Sunnah. What Hijāb has done is to confuse the issue of some of Allāh's

dependent on anything other than Himself.²⁷ And likewise, the atheists assert the same thing, the universe in its parts depends on itself, but as a whole, it is independent and requires nothing outside of itself. So this argument is unable to distinguish between these two, the creator and the created. When these poisonous principles are employed such as **“Anything with limited variables is dependent”**, and **“it is not possible for something with limited variables to forever exist”** and **“anything with such a description, which is finite in its composition, depends on something else in order for it to exist”**, then they lead to atheism, because Allāh, with His essence, with His existent reality (qadr) and description (ṣifah) cannot be excluded from these statements, except with negation of all of His attributes, and this in turn leads to an existence in the mind only, not in actual reality.²⁸ And hence, we

attributes returning back to others **with the issue of something depending on something separate from it and other than it altogether**, and either he did this out of ignorance, or on purpose in order to trick his followers into believing that I have made Allāh to be dependent upon other than Himself, **even though I explicitly stated otherwise** in my text above. Further, this argument of his is straight from the Mutafalsifah and Mu'tazilah, who treat the attributes of Allāh as entities on their own, and hence they claim that Ahl al-Sunnah say that Allāh is “composed of parts” and thus is in need and dependent on His “parts”, and that this is disbelief. And all of this is false, philosophical poison, the aim of which is to reject what is in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. All of I have done is to show the evil outcome of this philosophy, upon what Ibn Taymiyyah pointed out.

²⁷ The Mu'tazilah considered affirmation of attributes for Allāh's essence to be tarkīb (composition) and likening Allāh to created bodies, hence, they denied the attributes and made them all synonymous with Allāh's essence. And Ibn Sīnā took this idea to develop his argument of tarkīb for Allāh's oneness.

²⁸ [Update 28/06/2019](#): Hijāb commented on this passage: “Saying Allah has limited variables and is dependent is kufr akbar. You must repent for this at once.” [Response](#): This is nowhere to be found in my speech. Rather, the flow of the argument is clear. Which is that if you employ this innovated speech, then the

can now understand the statement of Ibn Taymiyyah—because all of these arguments, debates already took place in history and led to confusion, misguidance—he says:

“The Philosophers who speak of an eternal universe are of two types: The pure atheists, negators, those who say the universe is eternal, obligatory in its existence, and their statement is of the same category of that speech that Fir’aun proclaimed... a rejection of the Lord of the Worlds...”

And also: **“As for affirmation of the Maker of the universe, then this method does not achieve that, except upon the foundation of rejecting the attributes upon which they based their [version of] Tawḥīd. And this is a corrupt proof.”**

And also: **“Its outcome however, is the affirmation of an obligatory existence... All that this [argument] comprises is that within existence, there is an existence that is obligatory. And this is accepted by those who deny a Maker, such as Fir’aun, and the pure atheists such as the Philosophers, the [Bāṭinī] Qarāmites and their likes.”**

2. THE OXFORD UNIVERSITY DEBATE WITH ALEX

This is a longer, formal debate and we only want to highlight from the debate what is relevant to our discussion.²⁹ The same as what has

atheist will simply turn it around and apply it to Allāh, in order to prove to you, that Allāh is also dependent, finite, limited and so on, which is the same language you are using. And this is very clear throughout the article. This is because you chose philosophy and its dubious terms as the foundation for arguing and acquiring your belief. As a result, you must remain consistent with it and its necessities.

²⁹ There were numerous issues discussed in this debate and the Muslims had valid points in areas, such as in the issue of objective morality. However, in the issue of Allāh’s existence, they carried the same philosophical poison that was discussed earlier and it is this that part needs to be highlighted.

been illustrated above, to support the point we are making and which Ibn Taymiyyah highlighted in the previous citations from him.



At around 57 minutes in the discussion, al-Andalūsī (second from right), explains that “creation” or “causation” is to **“limit or define something”**, that **“limitations require explanation”** and that if something has no limitation then **“there is nothing that requires it to be determined because there are no boundaries that exist in it, it is fundamentally unlimited.”**³⁰ And here, they come to the same problem that Hijāb encountered with the three atheists, in that this is dubious, ambiguous speech, and it leads to the saying of the

³⁰ This is innovated, poisonous, misguided speech. Refer to our article on **Hadd and Taḥdīd**: <http://www.asharis.com/creed/?ntgjrfu>. The article discusses the issue of demarcation, limits and definitions in refutation of the Jahmites, and through it, one can understand why there is a problem with this speech. It is because Allāh has “defined” Himself in the Book and the Sunnah and because He is separate and distinct from His creation, not merged with it, and so He must be entered into this dubious speech, along with the rest of His creation. This is why these types of arguments result in atheism or the unity of existence doctrine.

Ḥulūlī Jahmites, that Allāh is everywhere. But Allāh is separate and distinct from His creation, with an existent reality (qadr) in terms of His essence and attributes, that He has always had in eternity, He never acquires a new attribute which He never had prior to acquiring it, unlike what the Karrāmiyyah say. And His existence is distinguished from what is besides Him, making His reality a distinguished, specific reality. So by denying “boundaries”, “limitations” and “defining of something”, then this is philosophical poison which sets the scene for the denial of Allāh’s attributes, or denial of His very existence or merging Him with His creation and arriving at the unity of existence. And this is what that atheist meant in the previous discussion, “So does God have infinite variables?”, which Hijāb fled from, and likewise when he said, “But God is not the tree”, which would mean that God has to be “limited” to use the innovated words employed by pseudophilosophers like Hijāb.

Then the atheist, Alex said: “You can’t posit a necessary being and say it does not require any explanation.” To which al-Andalūsī says: **“I did not say ‘necessary’, I said unlimited... this is because limitations require explanation. Not lack thereof.”** Alex asks: “And limitation as opposed to what, what’s the opposite?” Al-Andalūsī replies: “As opposed to not being limited.” And Alex asks: “And what is something not limited? It’s necessary, because if its not necessary, then its limited.”

Here, the inconsistencies start becoming apparent and this shows that philosophers, like al-Andalūsī and Hijāb, will use an argument in one place, and then oppose it in another place, when they are put on the spot, and then start changing their stances. This is because the goal is to win the argument—through faulty goods of course—and when they encounter problems, due to their faulty goods, they will

start falling into contradiction and inconsistency and changing the goalposts.

So here, al-Andalūsī denies that he said “necessary” and protests that he simply said “unlimited”. However the whole argument of Hijāb, as we can see in his other discussions is that whatever is “finite”, “limited” in its variables is dependent, cannot be necessary in its existence, and thus whatever is unlimited, must be necessary. And the atheist is simply recounting their own argument to them, which is that since, according to them, the universe is “finite”, “limited”, using their terms, which means it cannot be necessary, then the being they are asserting is necessary in its existence. So he is correctly making the connection between “necessary” and “unlimited” in recounting their own position to them.

So here Hijāb jumps in: “What is your definition of ‘necessary’ because you keep using it incorrectly. What is your understanding of necessary existence?” To which Alex replies: “Well you were talking about contingent things, its the opposite of that. Something that cannot have been differently.” Hijāb then verifies and says: “So, it cannot be differently and there is no explanation for it... outside of itself?” To which Alex replies: “Well, I suppose so.” Then Hijāb asks: “OK, So can you tell us how there can be a world with no necessary existence?” Alex replies: “...You said that we have to claim that we are living in a world of possible existences.” Hijāb then asks: “Do you agree that there could be... Do you accept that there could be a necessary existence.” Here Alex says: “I would say that... Yes.”

Hijāb quickly snaps, saying: “**Then that’s God, the debate is over thank your very much....**” And in this, Hijāb is in the clouds, in cloud cuckoo land, because proving a “necessary existence” through this argument does not equate to God, as we have seen in what has preceded, and Hijāb himself, when he was stuck with those three

atheists in the other discussion, when he was using a combined argument of tarkīb and ikhtiṣāṣ, of “finite and limited variables”, Hijāb was unable to distinguish God from the universe which they considered to be necessary and eternal, without depending on anything outside of it, because that’s all there is according to them. So when he was stuck, he said, **“We are not talking about God”**, when in reality he was, as otherwise, there would be no point at all in the discussion.

So coming back, when Hijāb snaps, **“Then that’s God”**³¹ and this is false, no it isn’t, because affirming a wujūd muṭlaq (non-specific existence in the mind) of a necessary being through this argument does not allow you to move to God, because this necessary being could be the universe. It does not follow and Hijāb must differentiate between an eternal, necessary universe and God. However, he can only do so with such means that will lead him to contradiction and that will necessitate God’s non-existence or His unity with the universe. It can only lead to either pure atheism, the saying of Fir’aun, or to the saying of the people of the unity of existence. So the atheist does not agree with this and speaks over Muḥammad Hijāb saying: **“But that does not have to be God, it doesn’t have to be God.”**

The atheist is absolutely correct, and this is what Ibn Taymiyyah made clear, that proving a “necessary existence” through this route does not amount to anything. It does not prove a creator, nor any act

³¹ Notice the contradiction between his discussion with the three atheists, when he said: “We are not talking about God”, and this is when he got stuck, unable to answer their valid objection, and here, he says “Then that’s God”. And this is clear in other discussions of Hijāb. So what is apparent is that Hijāb is simply out to win debates, and it is not on the basis of pure truth, coherence and honesty, but based on a combination of his arguments (flawed ones at that) and the use of tricks such as omission, diversion, evasion and manipulation.

of creation and is no different to the saying of Fir‘aun and the pure atheists.

So Hijāb then insists: “That is our understanding of God”. Alex, continues to deny this, “It does not have to be God”, and Hijāb says: “For us, a necessary existence is something which is... it couldn’t be any other way, it explains everything else. That’s our definition of God.” Alex protests: “But how does it explain everything else?” Hijāb says: “Because it if is necessary, it couldn’t be any other way... all contingent things depend upon it, yes?” Then some wrangling takes place over what is a contingent thing and what the atheist meant when he previously used the term “necessary existence” in some other discussion a while back with someone else.

The atheist disagrees with Hijāb’s interpretation of what he meant, and finally he says, in explanation of what he meant: “**The universe follows a necessary causal chain**” and that if he meant what Hijāb thinks he meant, then he retracts it though he did not mean that. Then there is further wrangling. However, none of the disputation changes the fact that even if Alex said he believes in a necessary existence, then that does not equate to God, as Hijāb claimed, rather it is just the universe to atheists like Fir‘aun and Alex. And hence, the point being made by this atheist Alex, was the same one made by Ibn Taymiyyah in pointing out the flaw of the argument.

Comments:

1. Since the argument of Ibn Sīnā can only prove that something has a necessary existence, without distinguishing what that is—whether the universe itself or Allāh³²—and since this is the doctrine

³² You have to keep in mind that Bāṭinī Kāfirs like Ibn Sīnā considered the universe to be eternal, being necessitated by Allāh’s existence, so the universe is a possible existence made necessary by Allāh’s necessary existence, and thus it is eternal

of Fir'aun and pure atheists, the contentions and arguments about all of this are just fruitless, since there is no disagreement on this, and that much is clear from the discussions we have analysed.

b. In order for that necessary existence to be Allāh, additional arguments about “finite”, “limited” and so on are used, and these arguments combine between tarkīb and ikhtiṣāṣ, both which are from Ibn Sīnā. In other words, this necessary being is a Creator, who is infinite, unlimited, not dependent, because all things which are composed, particularised, specified, with limited variables and so on, they can only have a possible existence, meaning they depend on something else to give them their particulars. In turn, when an atheist asks: “But is God infinite, is God this tree, is God everywhere?”, then it must be affirmed that God has a qadr (existent reality), alongside His attributes to oppose this, as this is what the Qur’ān and Sunnah came with, a creator with an essence, separate and distinct from His creation, described with attributes. This then invalidates the argument, and leads to atheism because God, with His qadr and ṣīfah, which gives Him a specific existence that separates Him from other entities with specific, particular existences, is entered into all of those entities which are said to have “limited variables”, “finite in composition”, “defined” and so on.

3. The atheist—and sad to say— is more straight in this issue³³ than these two misguided Muslims, because his claim is that the

along with Allāh. And this shows the danger of ignorant, misguided fools like Hijāb coming onto the scene and presenting the corrupt goods of that Bāṭinī Kāfir to Muslim audiences. Hence, the necessity of exposing such misguided fools.

³³ Earlier, in Hijāb’s main speech, he pointed out an apparent contradiction where Alex, in a previous discussion with someone else, asserted that the universe came from nothing, and yet in another discussion, he said “their ought to be a necessary existence.” Later, it is clarified that Alex said that determinism follows from a “necessary existence”, and Alex denied that he meant what Hijāb thinks he meant

universe follows on from and is nothing but a necessary causal chain. It is necessary in its existence as a whole, even if internally, there are dependencies, causal chains and determinisms. There is no evidence, from this argument of Ibn Sīnā, to say that this necessary existence has to be God, and this is true, as Ibn Taymiyyah pointed out in the flaw of this argument, because it is only **an abstract argument and proves only a general, unqualified, non-specific existence**, not a specific existence of a specific entity.

There is agreement between all people that there is a necessary existence. Then, all a smart, informed atheist has to do is to ask, “Is He all of the universe, or other than the universe?”, “Is this God, your necessary existence, above His Throne?”, “Does He have hearing and seeing?” And then mention all of what has come in the Qur’ān and the Sunnah of attributes and then simply say: “Your God has a specific configuration.” And further, that your Jahmites say: “God has no attributes” and “God is everywhere and not in one place exclusive to another” and your Mu’tazilites say: “God has names, but no attributes” and your Ash’arites say: “God only has seven attributes”, so this shows that there is no such thing as a “could not have been any other way” for this God, this necessary existence of yours, as you are all in disagreement with each other. So such an atheist would remain consistent in his line of reasoning, and the two Muslim pseudo-philosophers would not be able to refute the atheist using the goods, the faulty tools they chose to employ, and then they would

by “necessary existence”. He clarified his view that the universe, “follows a necessary causal chain”, and this is what he means. Again, this is the view of the atheists, like Fir’aun, that the universe is necessary in its existence, by itself and all that exists within the universe are causal chains and fluctuations of energy and matter, and since the universe is all that exists, it is not dependent on anything outside of it.

only have two choices: Atheism or reject the description of Allāh in the Qur’ān and the Sunnah, and end up with the dīn of the Jahmites, which in essence, and ultimately, leads back to atheism.

4. When Hijāb claims—after Alex says that there could be a necessary existence—**“Then that’s God, the debate is over thank your very much...”** This is false and his argument does not allow this conclusion, except with something additional. All people, atheists, theists, are in agreement there has to be a necessary existence. To merely affirm this necessary existence, upon this method of argument, does not make it God. And the shrewd atheists, when they see Muslims, and other than Muslims, making false claims and unproven extrapolations, they become further convinced in their atheism and believe that all that Muslims have to argue with are just fallacies.

We could continue and point out more and more, but perhaps there is sufficiency in what has preceded to make the desired point and to ensure the reader grasps this well. This is why the Salaf condemned the practitioners of this falsafah and kalām, because it is heresy, that leads to heresy, to atheism itself at the end of the affair. In short, Hijāb is grazing in the pastures of the Mutafalsifah and Jahmiyyah, and he is promoting misguidance.

People like Hijāb are simply artists, performers, entertainers. They boost their social media and tube following with their poisonous goods, their philosophy, by drawing Muslims into useless, fruitless debates, to show that they can philosophise and bamboozle atheists, when all they are doing is misguiding people and wasting their time, using arguments that clash with aspects of Islāmic creed.

The likes of Muḥammad Hijāb were spoken of by the Imāms, the Imāms of the four schools of jurisprudence and others.

Imām al-Shāfi‘ī (رَحِمَهُ اللهُ) said: ‘Abd Allāh bin Imām Aḥmad narrates from Muḥammad bin Dāwūd who said: It is not preserved during the era of ash-Shafi‘ī that he spoke of any of the desires (innovated matters), nor was it ascribed to him, and nor was he known for it, (this is) alongside his hatred for the people of kalām and bida‘ (innovations).³⁴ And he also said in his well-known and famous statement: “My ruling regarding Ahl ul-Kalām is that they are to be beaten with palm-branches and shoes, carried upon camels and paraded amongst the kinsfolk, it being announced about them, ‘This is the recompense of the one who abandoned the Book and the Sunnah and turned to kalām.’”³⁵ And he also said: “My ruling upon the people of kalām is the ruling of ‘Umar upon Sabīgh.”³⁶ And he also said: “No one entered into kalām and prospered.”³⁷

We ask Allāh to protect the Muslims from this falsehood and misguidance and to guide them to the way of the Salaf for it is **a’lam**, **aḥkam** and **aslam**—greater in knowledge, greater in precision and the most sound and safe.

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[A number of footnotes have been added to address Hijāb’s cheap, shallow and ignorant responses.](#)

³⁴ Dhamm ul-Kalām wa Ahlihī of Abū Ismā‘īl al-Harawī (4/282).

³⁵ Siyar A’lām an-Nubulā of al-Dhahabī, (10/29) and Ṣawn al-Manṭiq of al-Suyūtī, (no. 65), Manāqib al-Shāfi‘ī (1/462), and Dhamm ul-Kalām wa Ahlihī of Abū Ismā‘īl al-Harawī (4/294-295).

³⁶ Dhamm ul-Kalām wa Ahlihī of Abū Ismā‘īl al-Harawī (4/7-8). And Sabīgh was a man beaten with palm branches on his head by ‘Umar, until blood flowed from it, for entering into speculative, philosophical speech about the Qur’ān.

³⁷ Ibid, (4/285).