Muḥammad Hijāb, the Falāsifah, Mutafalsifah and Jahmiyyah: Laying the Foundations for the Dīn of the Philosophers and Jahmites Part 3: Oneness, Composition and Parts



INTRODUCTION

In the second part of this series, we cited from **Ibn al-Qayyim** (d. 751H) who outlined the route of the Mutafalsifah in arriving at the existence of a being with a necessary existence (wājib al-wujūd) through the argument that it is not composite (murakkab) and cannot have parts (ajzā', ab'āḍ), otherwise it would be in need, and thus only have a possible existence. This route lays the foundation—to those who devised it—for describing this necessary being as "not a jism", which means immaterial, incorporeal, and "without parts" and so on, which is the language of the misguided, wandering strayers who are far away from the revealed Books and sent messengers. It is not the language of the Prophets and their followers.

This dubious language provided rational justification for the rejection of the attributes by the Mutafalsifah, and also the negators among the Mutakallimīn, the Jahmiyyah and Muʿtazilah. After this, chameleons like **Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī** (d. 606H) came along and incorporated this same argument as evidence to reject Allāh's 'uluww

and His sifat khabariyyah, and this became the way of the Ash'arites thereafter. The Ash'arites themselves went through a few phases. The first, early phase of being close to the doctrine of Ibn Kullāab (d. 240H), affirming 'uluww and the sīfāt khabariyyah mentioned in the Qur'an. Then in the fifth century, they started moving towards the Mu'tazilah in denial of these affairs, with Abū Mansūr al-Baghdādī (d. 429H) and 'Abd al-Mālik al-Juwaynī (d. 478H). They denied 'uluww and the sifat khabariyyah. Then after the writings of al-Ghazāli (d. 505H) and al-Rāzī (d. 606H), kalām was hybridised with falsafah. It is here we see the likes of al-Rāzī gathering and compiling all the arguments he could, from every group and faction, just so that he could refute the People of the Sunnah in the issue of Allāh's 'uluww and the sifāt khabariyyah. To the extent that even the Ash'arites began to warn against him and his books, because he used the poison of the Mutafalsifah which comprised a refutation of their own theology in which they affirmed some of the attributes by way of 'agl (reason), not by way of nagl (revelation).

This is why Ibn Sīnā, as has been said, was "a shrewd kāfir", because he sought to poison the arguments of the Mutakallimīn, and al-Rāzī fell prey to that, and we alluded to this in Part 1. It is in these meadows and pastures that Muḥammad Hijāb has been grazing, and thus we see him producing what he is producing for his audience.

We return to the same speech of **Muḥammad Hijāb** that we addressed in Part 2, there is more in that speech which indicates the danger of indviduals who have filled themselves with philosophy and have scant knowledge of the madhhab of the Salaf. This ignorance will lead them to start speaking with statements that are the very foundations of great misguidance, without them realising, and in the process, sow the seeds of confusion and misguidance in the hearts of their listeners and admirers, those who are none the wiser.

PART 3: ONENESS, COMPOSITION AND PARTS

In this same video, Muhammad Hijāb outlines the argument of the Mutafalsifah, and then states, and it is the same speech we cited in Part 2 in this series:



(10:00 onwards): "There must be a necessary existence which everything depends upon, and it depends upon nothing, it must be one, and it also must be unique. Do you know why it must be unique, one? Because had it had something, for example if it was a composite, if it was a configured entity of many different parts then it would depend upon its parts for its existence. For example, like yourself right, you are a human being I'm a human being I have many different limbs, and parts and without those limbs and parts I couldn't exist. So in in essence I depend upon my parts to exist physically right so it must be something which doesn't have any parts right...." and later (17:54), "...it cannot be material and I'll tell you why it cannot be natural it must be immaterial... logically it cannot be a material entity, I'll tell you why everything which is a material entity is a composite configuration and as we discuss, a composite configuration is dependent upon its constituent parts. If something is dependent upon its constituent parts to exist it must be dependent and if it's dependent it can't be necessary."

Also in his debate with Tabash on 11 April 2019, after outlining the argument of imkān and wujūb, he went on to cite Sūrah al-Ikhlāş, and regarding the last verse, Hijāb said: "(وَلَمْ يَكُن لَّهُ كَفُوًا أَحَدٌ) And there is nothing like Him. He is immaterial, He is not composed of parts, he is incorporeal."

We want to focus on how this speech lays the foundations for the misguidance of the Mutafalsifah, Jahmiyyah and Mu'tazilah, and also of characters such as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606H).

COMMENTS

1. What Muḥammad Hijāb has outlined here provides the foundation for the philosophical Tawhīd of the Philosophers in which all attributes are negated from Allāh through the argument of tarkīb (composition) and iftiqār (need).¹ Likewise, it comprises a negation of Allāh's 'uluww and His ṣīfāt khabariyyah, and this is why al-Rāzī unscrupulously and hypocritically—used it, despite it being a refutation of the theology of the Ash'arites, at the same time. So al-Rāzī was scorned for that, for using arguments that undermine the

¹ To make it clear once more, we are not accusing Hijāb of speaking with the actual doctrines of the Mutafalsifah or Jahmiyyah, but pointing out that due to his wallowing in philosophy coupled with ignorance and lack of grounding in the way of the Salaf, he is falling into such errors in argument and speech which were the foundations of great misguidance and which were responsible for the splitting of the ummah.

affirmation of the Şifātiyyah among the Mutakallimīn of Allāh's attributes, the şifāt dhātiyyah.

2. The above language of Muḥammad Hijāb is such that it moves an individual towards the false notions expressed by al-Rāzī, when he wrote: "So we say: Indeed His, the Most High's saying, "Aḥad" [in Sūrah Ikhlāṣ 112:1] indicates the negation of *jismiyyah* (being a body), and negation of *al-ḥayyiz* (space) and *al-jihah* (direction). As for its indication that He, the Most High, is not a body (*jism*), then this is because the least of what a body is composed of is two [indivisible] particles (*jawharayn*), and this negates singularity (*waḥdah*), and when His saying 'Aḥad' (about Himself) is an exaggeration of the singularity (*wāḥidiyyah*), then His saying, "Ahad" negates *jismiyyah* (being a body)."² And he also said: "They said: It is established that every space-occupying object is divisible, and it is established that every divisible (thing) is not "Ahad" (singular, one)."³

What Hijāb says, "It cannot be material, it is immaterial", is the same as negation of jismiyyah that al-Jahm bin Ṣafwan brought into the ummah and which became the hallmark of both the Mutakallimīn and the Mutafalsifah, in their war against the People of the Sunnah, and it is what al-Rāzī is outlining above in the book he wrote in order to fight against Ahl al-Sunnah and declare them Mujassimah. And when Hijāb says, "He is not composed of parts", then that is similar to what al-Rāzī says above. So this language is alien, it is not the language of the Prophets and Messengers. It is dubious language that may contain truth and falsehood, and for this reason, such terms that were philosophically loaded, were used by the innovators and deviants to misguide hordes. We are not accusing Ḥijāb of being out to misguide the ummah in this affair of Tawhīd on purpose, rather, we

³ Ibid, p. 31.

² Asās al-Taqdīs (taḥqīq, al-Saqā, Cairo, 1986) pp. 30-31.

are simply pointing out that he is ignorant, and his indulgence in philosophy and ignorance of the Tawhīd of the Messengers and its pure language and the safe, sound madhhab of the Salaf in this field is what has led him into these dangerous areas.

3. In the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, the words $(e^{-2\epsilon})$, $(e^{-2\epsilon})$, an emphatic form of "one" and $(e^{-2\epsilon})$ are all used for created entities. This indicates the futility of al-Rāzī's argument that beings composed of parts or limbs, as are the creatures, [or having multiple attributes as the Philosophers would argue] prevents them from being referred to by these terms, wāḥid, waḥīd, aḥad. From such evidences brought by the Salaf and Imāms such as Ibn Taymiyyah to refute the Philosophers and the Jahmiyyah are the following:

The saying of Allāh (نفس (نفس واحدة): "O Mankind, have taqwā of your Lord who created you from a single soul (نفس واحدة), and from it created its spouse." (4:1). And also: "Leave me (to deal with) he whom I created alone (وحيدا)" (74:11). And also: "And if anyone (أحد)) of the pagans seeks your protection then grant him protection, so that he may hear the speech of Allāh" (9:6). And also the hadīth: "Let not one of you pray in a single garment (*thawbin wāhidin*) whilst nothing from it covers his shoulder."⁴

From these examples it becomes clear that the words wāhid and ahad are used in the Qur'ān and the language of the Arabs to refer to entities with multiple atttributes, and this applies to all existence, both to Allāh, and His creation, since there is nothing in existence except that it must be described with at least one attribute. So the intent here is to show that entities in the creation which have multiple attributes and admit to separability and division, such as a person who may lose an arm, or a loaf of bread that can be cut in half, or a gold coin

⁴ Reported by al-Bukhārī in his Ṣaḥīḥ.

from which a portion may be cut off and separated, then in the language of the Arabs and the language of the Qur'ān, they can be referred to as one (wāḥid, aḥad), a single person, a single loaf, a single coin and so on. And what al-Rāzī has brought is an innovated definition not known to the Arabs or in the Qur'ān, and he tried to use this in order to justify negation of 'uluww and the sīfāt khabariyyah, whereas the Mutafalsifah, like Ibn Sīnā, were using these same notions to deny all the attributes.

Thus, to present the notion that oneness and uniqueness means "not composite", "not material" or "immaterial", "not having parts" and so on, **straight after** one has used the method of Ibn Sīnā and completed it by augmenting it with the arguments of tarkīb and takhṣīṣ (which Hijāb calls "composite configuration")—[along with our knowledge that this is the very basis upon which the Mutafalsifah refute the affirmers of the sifāt dhātiyyah among the Mutakallimīn, and upon which unscrupulous individuals like al-Rāzī refute Ahl al-Sunnah in the sifāt khabariyyah]—then all of this is jahl (ignorance) which lays the foundations for misguidance. It is not the language of Ahl al-Sunnah in affirmation or negation.

4. Upon what has preceded, it is possible for a Jahmite to come along, and extending Hijāb's argument—in the manner of al-Rāzī, and say: "Allāh has a face, eyes and hand, and they are other than each other in Allāh's essence, and this necessitates composition, or parts, and thus Allāh is composite and therefore a body." So here, either you must negate these attributes in order to affirm the validity of the argument (and remain true to its necessities) or you reject the argument as false and affirm what came in the Qur'ān. And likewise, if you were a Mutafalsif, then you say: "Allāh has hearing and seeing, and they are other than each other in Allāh's essence, and this necessitates composite, and

therefore a body." So here you must deny these attributes. And this is exactly what that shrewd Kāfir, Ibn Sīnā wanted, and al-Rāzī gave it to him, by using this argument against Ahl al-Sunnah to deny the 'uluww of Allāh and His şifāt khabariyyah, at the cost of having to deal with the implications of this argument upon the şīfāt dhātiyyah that he and the Ash'arites affirm.

5. So this illustrates the difference between one who traverses the methodology of the Salaf, in whose precise speech, discussion, debate and argument, there is safety and freedom of ambiguity, and one who fills his belly with philosophy and is a pauper in the way of the Salaf and does not know which land he is in. It was not in jest and idle play that the Salaf condemned the speech of those doctrinal schools centred around negation of bodies (ajsām, jismiyyah, material, composite) and parts (ajzā', ab'āḍ) and so on, because they knew this was the foundation of misguidance.

It is related from Ibn Surayj al-Shāfi'ī (d. 306H) (شركة): "The Tawhīd of the people of knowledge and the Jamā'ah of the Muslims is "I testify none is worthy of worship except Allāh (alone) and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allāh". And the Tawhīd of the people of falsehood is disputing about *al-a'rād* (incidental attributes) and *al-ajsām* (bodies) and the Prophet (مَالَكَتَكَرُوْتَكَالُكُوْ) was sent with the rejection of that."⁵ And Abu Bakr al-Marwazī reported:I heard Abū 'Abd Allāh [Imām Aḥmad] (d. 241H) (مَالكُوْنَا saying: "Whoever takes to kalām will never prosper and whoever takes to kalām will not escape

⁵ Abū Ismāʿīl al-Harawī with his isnād in *Dhamm ul-Kalām* (4/385-386) and Ibn Taymiyyah in *Bayān Talbīs al-Jahmiyyah*. And he means that the speech of the people of disbelief from the Philosophers and other than them regarding the creator was based upon the likes of these philosophical terms and discussions, and the Prophet (حَالَتُعَارَبُولُ) came to guide people with the light of revelation and to reject false and ignorant speech regarding belief in Allāh and the unseen.

from tajahhum (adopting the ūsūl of the Jahmiyyah)."⁶ And Ibn Abī Hātim said: "My father (Abū Hātim al-Rāzī) and Abū Zurʿah (al-Rāzī) used to say, "Whoever sought religion with *kalām*, will go astray."⁷

What has preceded is advice for this brother, Muhammad Hijāb and his followers and admirers, may Allāh grant them success to right guidance in the affair, āmīn. And they should know that if they truly love Muhammad Hijāb, then they should encourage him to remove his ignorance regarding the way of the Salaf and to follow it, in speech and deed, in da wah and in methodology and to abandon what opposes it—and this is what we desire for every Muslim.

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 ⁶ Ibn Batțăh in Kitāb al-Ibānah, Kitāb al-Īmān (2/537).
⁷ Ibid, (4/383).