

Muḥammad Hijāb, the Falāsifah, Mutafalsifah and Jahmiyyah: Laying the Foundations for the Dīn of the Philosophers and Jahmites Part 6: Sūrah Ikhlāṣ Between the Tawḥīd of the Salaf and the Tawḥīd of the Philosophers and Jahmites



Introduction

In this article from our series we want to explain **the difference** between the statements of the Salaf and the sound meanings they comprise, in accordance with what is intended by the Book and the Sunnah, and those of the Mutafalsifah and the Mutakallimūn and what they comprise of falsehood and what is intended by them of laying down foundations for the rejection of what Allāh (عَزَّوَجَلَّ) and His Messenger (صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ) affirmed for Him. To introduce this subject, and to aid in its comprehension, we can give a quick, byte-sized, brief illustration by way of an example. The word “**tafwīd**” (entrustment, consignment) is used by the Salaf and those upon their way and likewise the later Jahmites and what both parties intend by this word are different. The Salaf intend ignorance of the kaifiyyah of the reality that the word with its meaning points to. Whereas the Jahmites mean negation of the meanings and the realities. And the difference lies in the fact that both parties came to use this word through **two entirely different routes**. This leads us into:

The Innovation of Kalām Condemned by the Salaf and its Practitioners Declared as Misguided Heretics

The Mutakallimūn innovated philosophical conceptual baggage into the acquisition of creed which they labelled as “reason (‘aql)” Their theology was based around **negation of jismiyyah** from Allāh, which means **not material**, that He is **immaterial, incorporeal**. This was necessitated upon them because of the type of argument they used to prove Allāh’s existence. They devised these proofs to debate atheists and philosophers and they had taken this approach from the Hellenized Jews, Christians and Sabeans. Upon this basis, they then approached the texts of the Qur’ān and either explained them away, if they mentioned attributes and actions for Allāh (such as raḥmah, ḥikmah, wajh, yadayn, istiwā’, ḥubb and so on), or they **injected their philosophical baggage** into certain words, which then allowed them to negate the attributes in an indirect manner, through the claim of tanzīh (negating defects from Allāh). The various terms they targeted included the meaning of wāḥid, aḥad which is “one”, by way of example. Upon this basis, they argued for a particular version of Tawḥīd which was not the Tawḥīd of the Messengers, but rather the Tawḥīd of the Philosophers—wherein Allāh’s names, attributes and actions are eroded and undermined, to varying degrees. At the very extreme end, you are left with just an abstract notion of oneness in the mind as your version of Tawḥīd, which has no existence in external reality.

So from the texts that the Jahmites latched onto was **Sūrah Ikhḷāṣ**. And this chapter was revealed in refutation of the Christians and all those who ascribed offspring to Allāh.

—The Christians claimed Allāh has a son.

—Some among the Jews made Ezra into Allāh’s son, and a small faction of them were present in the era of the Prophet (صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ).

—The Pagan Arabs who ascribed daughters to Allāh.

—Likewise, the Greek Philosophers, who claimed that the intellect and the soul and the orbits, they emanate from the first cause, or the prime mover, or the active intellect, that the intellect is the male and the soul is the female and so on.

So in all these beliefs, it is claimed that something came from Allāh and separated from Him, it was produced through Him (tawallud).

The Qur'ānic Refutation of Ascribing Offspring to Allāh

So Sūrah Ikhhlāṣ is a refutation of all of these false beliefs and the Salaf explained the meanings of the words in this sūrah based upon other verses of the Qur'ān and upon their ordinary meanings in the language . And on the basis of what is transmitted from the Salaf in this respect, there are two main statements which concern us:¹

—(الذي لا جوف له): He who has no interior.

—(الذي لا يخرج منه شيء): He out of whom nothing comes

And upon this, the following is the correct meaning of al-Ṣamad:

—He who has no interior, no bowels, into whom nothing enters and from whom nothing comes out, who does not eat, does not drink. He from whom there is no **tawallud**, (generation, production from him), such that a part of Him leaves Him, giving rise to other entities. All of this is in opposition to the creatures, for they have interiors, they have bowels, they eat and drink, they excrete. They have offspring which is produced by a part of them leaving them. So there is infiṣāl (separation), inqisām (division) and so on, in the creatures, but this is completely negated from Allāh.

And all of this is a refutation of those Jews, Christians and Pagans who ascribe offspring to Allāh or those Philosophers who said what

¹ There are other meanings, but it is these meanings that concern us in this particular discussion.

they said which is similar to these statements, but with respect to the intellect and soul.

Hence, Jesus (عَلَيْهِ السَّلَام) is not a part of Allāh and Allāh is not one of three, for there is not tawallud from Allāh, such that a part of Him separates from Him or something comes out of Him, as we see with the creatures, and thus He is only one, not many.

The Route of the Jahmiyyah, Mu'tazilah in Negating Jismiyyah, Tarkīb and Related Philosophically Loaded Terms

However, this chapter was used by the negators of the attributes such as **al-Jahm bin Ṣafwān** and **al-Hudhayl bin 'Allāf**, from the top theoreticians of the Mu'tazilah. They said, "Allāh is not a jism", meaning He is immaterial, not material and this is where Muḥammad Hijāb's speech is coming from, and he is drawing from them and from the Mutafalsifah, the likes of Ibn Sīnā, al-Rāzī and others. So Hijāb's route is the same route as those Jahmites, Mu'tazilites and Murjī'ites who came together and debated Imām Aḥmad, and they argued through negation of jismiyyah, and they tried to inject this into the texts of the Qur'ān, claiming that this is the meaning of al-Aḥad and al-Ṣamad, through the notion of jismiyyah and the notion of iftiqār between the parts of that which is composed.

Abū 'Īsā Muḥammad Burghūth (a Mu'tazilite) argued against Imām Aḥmad using falsafah and kalām and negation of jismiyyah, as Ibn Taymiyyah explains: "And Aḥmad and his likes from the Salaf knew that these words innovated by the Mutakallimūn such as the word jism (material, body) and others, they were being negated by a people so that through their negation, they can reach negation of what Allāh the Exalted and His Messenger affirmed, and another people affirmed (these words) so that by their affirmation they can arrive at the affirmation of what Allāh and His Messenger negated.

So the first is the method of the Jahmites, from the Mu‘tazilah and others. They make negation of jism (body, material) so that Muslims presume that they intend tanzīh (to negate defects from Allāh)... And the Salaf and the leading Imāms detested this innovated speech because it comprises falsehood and lying, and speaking about Allāh without knowledge. And likewise, Imām Aḥmad mentioned in his refutation of the Jahmites, that they fabricate a lie upon Allāh in what they negate from Him and speak about Him without knowledge... For this reason when Abū al-‘Abbās ibn Surayj was asked about Tawḥīd, he mentioned the Tawḥīd of the Muslims, and then said: ‘And as for the Tawḥīd of the people of falsehood, then it is delving into the bodies (jawāhir) and incidental attributes (a‘rād), and Allāh sent the Prophet (صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ) with rejection of that.’... ”²

And he also said:

“And the word ‘jism’ (material, body) is an innovated, introduced word, it is not for anyone to speak with it at all.”³

And he also said:

“And these innovated, generalised, negatory words such as the word **tarkīb (composition)**, and **mu‘allaf (composed)** and **munqasim (divisible)** and their likes, then everyone who desires to negate something from what Allāh affirmed for Himself of names and attributes expresses his intent by way of them. Then the one who does not know his intent would presume that He intends to make tanzīh (negate defects) of the Lord in the manner that has come in the Qur’ān, which is to affirm His Aḥadiyyah (Oneness) and Ṣamadiyyah (Self-Sufficiency). But he (who intended negation) injected into these words... what was not from the language of the Arabs that the Qur’ān was revealed with, and nor in the language of

² Tafsīr Ibn Taymiyyah (7/332-336).

³ Ibid (7/341).

any of the nations. Then he makes that meaning to be the meaning of al-Aḥad, al-Ṣamad and al-Wāḥīd, and other such names which are present in the Book and the Sunnah, and He would make the meanings he negated which Allāh and His Messenger affirmed, to be the completion of Tawḥīd.”⁴

The difference between the Salaf and the misguided Jahmites is made clear by Ibn Taymiyyah in that: “When the leading Imāms, such as Imām Aḥmad and Fuḍayl bin ‘Iyāḍ and others desired to mention the tanzīh (perfection, absence of defects) that Allāh deserves, they mentioned Sūrah Ikhḷāṣ which equals one third of the Qur’ān, that it sufficiently covers everything which is negated in this subject area. For this reason, when the Jahmites—such as ‘Īsā Muḥammad bin ‘Īsā Burghūth and others from the Basrans and Baghdādīs debated with Imām Aḥmad—and they mentioned the jism (material, body) and its necessities, Aḥmad mentioned Sūrah Ikhḷāṣ to them because within it is the tanzīh which is true, and which is other than what they had entered into the word jism of false additions.”⁵

So here we see the difference between the Salafi way of approaching and speaking about these texts and the way of the Jahmiyyah and Mu’tazilah in approaching these texts, **through the route of kalām and innovated terminology** which came from the Greek Philosophers and the Hellenized Jews, Christians and Sabeans that they took from.

Upon what has preceded, it is possible for a Salafi, Sunnī, Atharī to say that Allāh has refuted the Christians, Jews, Pagans and Philosophers by establishing that nothing is produced or born out of him (tawallud) such that He has been subject to division and separation, and this meaning is correct and in accordance with what

⁴ Ibid (7/350).

⁵ Bayān Talbīs al-Jahmiyyah (2/57-58).

the Qur’ān intended and upon what the Salaf understood and explained, that He has no interior and nothing comes out of Him. And we can negate this from Allāh, though we adhere to the language of the Qur’ān in affirmation and negation. And as for the sphere of refutation and clarification, it can be the case that these innovated terms are analysed, deciphered and employed with true meanings isolated from false meanings, and this is what some of the Imāms did, like al-Dārimī and Ibn Taymiyyah in this context.

But this is different from a Jahmite or a Mutafalsif **who—in the affirmation and acquisition of creed—comes from a different, innovated route**⁶, and makes negations of jismiyyah, tarkīb, parts and so on, all of which is part of philosophical rhetoric which leads to falsehood and the eventual negation of Allāh’s attributes if its logical necessities and requirements are followed through completely.

And this is the speech of Muḥammad Hijāb which we have been addressing: **“This thing must be one, it cannot have parts, it must be immaterial, incorporeal”** and **“He is immaterial, He is not composed of parts, he is incorporeal...”** and **“...it cannot be material and I’ll tell you why it cannot be natural, it must be immaterial... logically it cannot be a material entity, I’ll tell you why everything which is a material entity is a composite configuration...”** And this is the route of Ibn Sīnā and of the Mutakallimīn who followed him in that, and their proof for trying to establish Allāh’s oneness, through the negation of tarkīb (composition), following the argument of imkān and wujūb, then Ibn Taymiyyah described that as **a ḥujjah bāṭilah**, as we cited from him in Part 4 of this series:

⁶ Keeping in mind that Muḥammad Hijāb—in making these statements—is not in the context of refuting the Mutafalsifah and Mutakallimūn, but in the context of making affirmation of creed, of belief in Allāh and His attributes.

“Chapter: After he [al-Aṣbahānī] corroborated the existence of the Maker, the Sublime [through the proof of imkān and wujūb], he began affirming His oneness. So he said: ‘And the evidence for His oneness is that there is no composition (tarkīb) in Him in any way, otherwise He would not have been obligatory in existence in His essence, [due to] the necessity of His need for that which He is composed of. And binding from this is that there cannot be two of His type. If that were so, the existence of two without distinction [between them] would be binding, and that is impossible.’ [Ibn Taymiyyah]: He has taken this evidence⁷ from the speech of Abu ‘Abd Allāh al-Rāzī, and he [al-Rāzī] followed in this [matter] the way of the Mutafalsifah such as Ibn Sīnā and his likes. And this is what they depend upon in what they claim of [their understanding of] Tawḥīd. **And it is a futile proof.** Their intent in what they claim is to reject the attributes. And the scholars of the Muslims have explained its futility, as was done by Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī in ‘Tahāfut al-Falāsifah’ and just as al-Rāzī and others criticised this method in other places.”⁸ End of quote from Ibn Taymiyyah.

And this is what Ibn al-Qayyim spoke of in what we cited in Part 2 of this series:

“As for the Philosophers, they affirmed the Maker through the way of *tarkīb* (composition) which is that [created] bodies (*ajsām*) are composed (*murakkabah*) and anything that is composite is needy

⁷ Meaning this evidence of proving Allāh’s oneness through the argument of tarkīb (composition) and dependency, need (iftiqār) on parts, if He was composed, which would then contradict His obligatory existence, since what is in need can only have a possible existence. And this is what Muḥammad Hijāb is upon, following Ibn Sīnā and those who fell for this trojan horse argument by which negation of the attributes and a false, philosophical Tawḥīd is intended.

⁸ This is why I referred to al-Rāzī in previous parts as a “chameleon”, because he was all over the place, confused, in contradiction.

and dependent (*yaftaqir*) upon its parts (*ajzā'*), and everything that is needy (*muftaqir*) then its existence is only possible (*mumkin*, as opposed to necessary, *wājib*), and that whose existence is only possible (*mumkin*) must have an agent whose existence is necessary (*wājib*). And numerousness (*kathrah*) in the essence (*dhāt*) of that whose existence is necessary is impossible, since that necessitates its composition (*tarkīb*) and need (*iftiqār*), and this contradicts its necessary existence. And this is the limit of their Tawḥīd, and through it did they affirm the Creator, according to their claim. It is known that this is the greatest of evidences for the negation of the Creator, for it negates His power (*qudrah*), will (*mashī'ah*), knowledge (*'ilm*) and life (*ḥayāt*). Because if these attributes were affirmed for Him, according to their claim, He would be composite (*murakkab*, composed of parts), and that which is composite is in need of other than it (*muftaqiran ilā ghayrihi*), and therefore, cannot be necessary (in existence) by itself. And in this doubt there is such deceit and fraud, and [the use of] generalized words and ambiguous meanings whose description will become very lengthy.”⁹

Thus, the one who tries to ascribe this to Sūrah Ikhilāṣ, then he is throwing the deceptive, fraudulent innovation of the Jahmiyyah, Mu‘tazilah and Mutafalsifah on to the Qur‘ān.

Upon what has preceded, we have established the difference between the tafsīr of the Salaf of Sūrah Ikhilāṣ and the speech of Ibn Sīnā, al-Rāzī and the Ash‘arites who were baited and gamed by Ibn Sīnā, and likewise Muhammad Hijāb who has been grazing in those

⁹ Refer to *Mukhtaṣar al-Ṣawā‘iq* (2/365).

pastures, collecting fodder and then trying to validate it all through the speech of Ibn Taymiyyah, as outer packaging.¹⁰

In Conclusion:

The statement of Muḥammad Hijāb which is the argument of imkān and wujūb followed by negation of tarkīb:

“Do you know why it must be unique, one? Because had it had something, for example if it was a composite, if it was a configured entity of many different parts then it would depend upon its parts for its existence” is the dīn of the Jahmites, of Ibn Sīnā, of al-Rāzī and their likes, and of whoever desired to negate Allāh’s ‘uluww and ṣifāt khabariyyah such as His face, hands and eyes.

And the statement of Muḥammad Hijāb:

“...it cannot be material and I’ll tell you why it cannot be natural, it must be immaterial... logically it cannot be a material entity”, and also, **“He is immaterial... he is incorporeal...”**, ascribing this to Sūrah Ikhlāṣ, then this is identical to the speech of the Jahmites, “He is not a jism, and He is unlike the ajsām”, which itself is an extension of what they took from the Sabean Harrānian Philosophers, and the injection of this philosophy into Sūrah Ikhlāṣ is falsehood. And this was the argument of Burghūth, the Mu’tazilī and Ibn Abī Du’ād who brought the Ahl al-Kalām from Baṣra and Bagdhād to debate Imām Aḥmad in order to negate the attributes and prove the Qur’ān was created, and they included Jahmiyyah,

¹⁰ One has to read Ibn Taymiyyah’s books very carefully to grasp what is actually going on, as there is always a wider, broader context with multiple players being addressed, through a variety of narratives.

Mu'tazilah, Murji'āh, Ḍirāriyyah and others—all of them Ahl al-Bid'ah, differing with each other, but united against a Salafī Imām.¹¹

All of these statements, from this route, are from the angle of laying down the foundations for the Tawḥīd of the Philosophers and Jahmites which undermines the Tawḥīd of the Prophets and Messengers. These statements are not the tanzīh of the Salaf, rather they are the tanzīh of the Mutafalsifah, Jahmiyyah and Mu'tazilah, and they are **a trojan horse**.

And we state once more, that we do not accuse Muḥammad Hijāb of being a denier of the attributes, but it is evidently the case that he has been grazing in the pastures of the Mutafalsifah and Jahmiyyah and Mu'tazilah, collecting intellectual fodder, and then he tried to beautify that and cover it up with some speech of Ibn Taymiyyah, and he does not understand the writings of Ibn Taymiyyah—rather he would be put to trial by some of the statements of Ibn Taymiyyah—thinking that they support the falsehood he is speaking with and refute what we have been explaining—when the reality is otherwise.

Thus, there is a difference between the tafwīd of the Salaf and the tafwīd of the Jahmiyyah and there is a difference between the tanzīh of the Salaf and the tanzīh of the Jahmiyyah. The Salaf entered through the front door in arriving at their speech, and the Jahmites entered through the back door in deriving their speech.

We ask Allāh to guide the Muslims to the creed and methodology of the Salaf in all statements and deeds for that is the way to true rectification and unity. Amīn.

¹¹ And this is the of the people of innovations and falsehood in every age and era, they forget their differences between each other in order to unite against the people of truth, those who are upon the way of the Salaf in belief, speech, action and methodology.

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18 Shawwāl 1440 / 21 June 2019 v. 1.05