

Muḥammad Hijāb, the Falāsifah, Mutafalsifah and Jahmiyyah: Laying the Foundations for the Dīn of the Philosophers and Jahmites Part 12: Retractions, Belittling the Companions and Misquoting Ibn Taymiyyah to Justify One's Misguidance

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



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"وأما مخاطبة أهل الاصطلاح باصطلاحهم
ولغتهم فليس بمكروه..
١- إذا احتيج إلى ذلك.
٢- وكانت المعاني صحيحة.
كمخاطبة العجم من الروم والفرس والترك
بلغتهم وعرفهم، فإن هذا جائز حسن
للحاجة"

ابن تيمية- الدرء ١/٤٣

INTRODUCTION

Muḥammad Hijāb is from the people who employ the innnovated toolset of falsafah and kalām, those whom the Salaf condemned, declared astray and considered them as callers to atheism, in particular the Jahmites. This is because they employ toxic, trojan-horse arguments whose inevitable outcome is the statement that **no wilfully chosen act of creation took place** which led to this creation, that the universe is eternal, and it opens the way for the doctrines of **ittiḥād**, **ḥulūl** and of **waḥdat al-wujūd**. The Salaf of the first and second century hijrah were **extremely foresighted** in their condemnation of the Jahmites, Muʿtazilites and those who followed in their way in the third century hijrah, the Kullābiyyah. Fast forward three centuries later and you come to **Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī** (d. 606H) and this man is bewildered, confused, not knowing whether the arguments for the origination of the universe are stronger or those for the eternity of the universe are stronger, and speaks of **the equivalence of evidences** (takāfuʿ al-adillah). So Muḥammad Hijāb is utilising these goods which led to these calamities and which led to Allāh’s punishment upon this ummah, with the unleashing of the Crusaders and the Mongols upon them, let alone rulers of tyranny on account of affairs of sin and oppression alone, which are less severe than ilhād and taʿṭīl.

Further, Hijāb is using the worst of those toxic goods, those of Ibn Sīnā (d. 429H), the Bāṭinī Ismāʿīlī Shīʿite.

We provided much **indisputable empirical evidence** from his discussions and debates to show that these arguments do not establish the Rubūbiyyah of Allāh at all, but only an existence in the mind of something called “necessary in existence” (wājib al-wujūd), and which cannot be distinguished from the religion of Firʿaun, of pure atheists, and from the doctrine of the unity of existence. It is an

argument which demands the negation of Allāh’s names, attributes and actions by logical necessity. These affairs have already played out in history and Hijāb perpetuates these affairs, leading Muslims to be put to trial in their religion.

Hijāb is an arrogant man and refuses to accept the truth in this particular matter, even if he has now acknowledged errors in some of his statements. Let us address this issue before we tackle the subject matter of this article

HIJAB’S RETRACTIONS

I have been informed that Hijāb has acknowledged he was wrong in his statements—[that the Qur’ān is eternally in the Preserved Tablet, that Allāh’s attribute of speech is “part of Him” and referring to Allāh’s size in connection to a muon particle]—I am assuming it is these statements he is retracting from.

However, his excuse is that when a person talks a lot, like he does, he is bound to make mistakes.

This excuse is invalid in the case of Hijāb.

This is because there is a difference between slips of the tongue coming from a person who has knowledge and understanding and between errors that come from a person who is ignorant and lacks comprehension and speaks in affairs he is not qualified, with other than knowledge. Hijāb’s mistakes arose because he is ignorant and is using kalām and falsafah. To speak about Allāh without knowledge is ḥarām and is from the greatest of crimes, as Allāh (عَزَّوَجَلَّ) stated:

قُلْ إِنَّمَا حَرَّمَ رَبِّيَ الْفَوَاحِشَ مَا ظَهَرَ مِنْهَا وَمَا بَطَنَ وَالْإِثْمَ وَالْبَغْيَ بِغَيْرِ الْحَقِّ وَأَنْ تُشْرِكُوا
بِاللَّهِ مَا لَمْ يَنْزِلْ بِهِ سُلْطَانًا وَأَنْ تَقُولُوا عَلَى اللَّهِ مَا لَا تَعْلَمُونَ

“Say [O Muḥammad]: ‘(But) the things that my Lord has indeed forbidden are immoralities whether committed openly

or secretly, sins (of all kinds), oppression without right, joining partners (in worship) with Allāh for which He has given no authority, and saying things about Allāh of which you have no knowledge.” (7:33).

So his mistakes arise from this angle, from speaking about Allāh without knowledge, without study of the creed of the Salaf, without grounding. They are not from the angle of one who made an unintentional slip of the tongue or pen whilst being grounded in knowledge. Further, he arrogantly persistst upon validating his misguidance by considering his falsafah to be valid, and thus he is an unrepentant, misguided innovator. At the same time, he continues his mockery, personal attacks and strives to bring down People of the Sunnah at all costs. This indicates that this man has no sincerity at all, because in these situations, outward actions provide evidence as to what is in a person’s heart. So what he is doing is not out of sincerity of purpose, but it is to protect his image and polish his ego and use every underhanded method to bring down his adversary. And this is injustice.

Pay careful attention to this amazing speech of Ibn Taymiyyah, and you will come to realise what difference there is between the People of Tawḥīd and Sunnah, people of justice, and the People of kalām and falsafah like Hijāb, people of injustice and transgression:

فلا يحل لنا أن نحملنا بغض قوم - وإن كنا نبغضهم في الله - على
أن لا نعدل عليهم فيما هو من حقوق العباد. فكيف في أمور الديانات!؟


“Thus, it is not lawful for us that our hatred for a people—even if we hate them for the sake of Allāh—carries us to not behave with them with justice in what relates to the rights of the servants, so how then, in religious affairs?”

Ibn Taymiyyah said these words in critiquing the Mutakallimīn in their refutations, that you cannot refute your adversaries with falsehood and that you cannot refute bid'ah with bid'ah and that you cannot refute someone just to support a viewpoint or orientation, rather it has to be to support what the Messenger came with of truth and guidance.

So even though we hate innovators like Hijāb for the sake of Allāh in matters of religion, due to his innovation and misguidance, leading others astray—[and this is part and parcel of īmān, to hate falsehood and its people, but without doing them an iota of injustice]—we have not resorted to any of the evil, despicable, depraved tactics Hijāb has entered into. We have no concern with any of his private affairs or personal life, and we have nothing to say about his appearance, clothing, speech, food preferences and worldly dealings and so on. All of this would be oppression and violating a person's rights.

So when it is the case that we have not embarked upon any of these types of behaviours, abiding by justice, then this is evidence that we have not been unjust to him in religious affairs either, in that we have criticised him upon truth and justice, without oppression. As for Hijāb, then his despicable behaviour in violating the worldly rights of a Muslim—when Hijāb seeks out scandals and solicits information in order to denigrate his adversary, and all he has are lies and fabrications and distortions of truth—then this is evidence that he will be behaving with similar injustice, lies and deceptions in his religious affairs. We know full well that he is using deception and tricking people on the actual knowledge based issues in which he is trying his best to attack us and accuse us of having fallen into misguidance.

Coming back to the issue of Hijāb's excuse for falling into those errors. Just look at these two tweets:



He first tweeted this at 17:00, deleted it and then changed it to what is in the second tweet at 21:52.

First of all, the major scholars praised Bin Lādīn for his support of the Afghānī Jihād, before they knew the direction he chose, one of extremism, takfīr and khurūj, having gone in this direction because his teachers were Ikhwānīs, Quṭbīsts. When they came to know this, they refuted him and warned against him openly. As for their praise of Shaykh Rabī, that was **after all the lies and slanders made against him** for defending the methodology of the Prophets in calling to Allāh and rectifying societies and a refutation of all the opposers in this field. So they defended him and stated he is clearly on the truth, his adversaries are upon falsehood, that knowledge and understanding is with him, and that they only spoke ill of him because he criticised their symbolic figureheads.

So that is a very bad comparison, Hijāb.

Second, by mentioning the Companions here, what you are trying to do is to make light of your own mistakes and somehow imply that the Companions fell into major innovations in creed. Rather, you used the word “prone” which means **tendency and inclination**. And this is a revilement of the Companions. Then you added that “We

reject some of the opinions of the companions every day.” So for argument’s sake, even though we disagree with this statement of “rejecting their opinions every day”, you are trying to conflate fiqh opinions and ijtihāds with major issues of belief. You are implying they fell into the calamitous statements you have fallen into, that they were prone to do so. And in all of this, you are trying to protect your own self and your reputation at the cost of belittling the Companions. **When you consume the whiskey of kalām and falsfah, and you are a conniving, egotistical individual, this is what you are going to be led to.** All of the filth in your heart is going to come out, bit by bit. If you are not honest from the beginning, and do not remain straight, you will be led to further crookedness, and Allāh will expose you through your own words and deeds in broad daylight.

So then Hijāb deleted this tweet and then he reposted it but removed the last sentence. And now, he has actually deleted the second tweet as well, because even that has what is unbecoming.

The point there then is that Hijāb’s errors are not slips and mistakes just because he talks a lot and sooner or later, errors are going to occur and everyone makes errors. Rather, it is because he is a rank ignoramus in the foundational affairs of religion—whilst supposedly versed in falsafah and kalām—and he falls into errors from this angle, from ignorance and pseudo-scholarship. This is an extremely serious major sin, to speak without knowledge.

So Hijāb was forced into this retraction because the issues were indisputable, everybody can see this. He would be silly not to take those things back because they are so clear, the issue of making the Qur’ān eternal in the Preserved Tablet and saying that Allāh’s attributes are parts, in more than one conversation with Christians, in an identical context. He had to acknowledge these mistakes.

However, his resentment and malice, and his poisonous venom is all but apparent. He is a **buried scorpion** that was plucked out of the sand, becoming mad and going ballistic with its tail, wanting to sting those who exposed it.

Hijāb is only trying to save his reputation. And he has a slippery way of doing it. He is aiming to win the sympathies of his audience. “Hey, look I admitted my errors, everyone makes them, but you have to be fair, you have to now admit yours.” So this is a way he is trying to level himself. As for his lies, fabrications and slanders, then we have already laid waste to them and the only reason Hijāb does not understand is because he is intoxicated with falsafah and kalām, which befogs the intellect. He still does not get the issue of Allāh’s chosen actions, his attributes such as mercy, creating, speaking, which depend on Allāh’s will, meaning they are determined by, and controlled by and result from, Allāh’s will. Because he is poisoned by the falsafah of Ibn Sīnā and the tarkīb of the Mu‘tazilah, he considers what is a correct meaning to be tajsīm and kufr. So this is the effect of innovation on its people, it blinds their hearts and minds.

In any case, despite this retraction, he is still adamant upon his methodology, his innovated falsafah and kalām and is refusing to acknowledge the truth. To the extent that he will misquote scholars to justify it. He posted a quote from Ibn Taymiyyah which he does not understand and which has a wider context which is a refutation of Hijāb and his misguided innovation.

It seems this man is intoxicated by **the Whiskey of kalām and falsafah**. He is erratic, all over the place, arrogant and abusive. He should know that we are now at second **No. Twelve**, in a **Proper choke-hold**, and he must either tap out or pass out. Because Hijāb has now signalled that he is wilfully choosing misguidance over guidance, and trying to justify it through falsehood, lies, deceptions,

misquotes and so on—being very abusive and arrogant at the same time—then our choke-hold will continue to completion.

MISUSE OF IBN TAYMIYYAH’S SPEECH

Hijāb posted out a tweet, which was sent to me. To make it clear again, **I do not follow his tweets or social media, I do not listen to his sound recordings, nor do I watch any of his video responses, if he has any.** However, people narrate to me any claims of significance he may make. My response is only insofar as people may benefit from the resultant clarifications and learn something. **I have no interest in Hijāb himself as a person.** He is just a vehicle, a medium. This is an opportunity to distinguish the Tawḥīd of the Messengers from the Tawḥīd of the Philosophers. An opportunity to distinguish Sunnah from Bid’ah, and Waḥy from kalām, ra”ī, falsafah. There is nothing personal here at all, and we are not interested in Hijāb as much as we are interested in protecting the creed of the Muslims and safeguarding Muslims from being led to doubt. There are always going to be Hijābs in existence and from time to time they will come out of the sand with their poisonous sting, like scorpions, so they have to be stamped upon.

To justify his bid’ah and ḍalālāh, Hijāb cited the following statement from the 1st volume of Ibn Taymiyyah’s **Dar’ al-Ta’arūd**.

What Hijāb is doing here is trying to reframe the issue into one of terminologies alone. In this statement Ibn Taymiyyah says:

“As for addressing people of technical terminology with their



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terminology and their language, then it is not disliked when there is a need for that and when the meanings are correct. Such as addressing the non-Arabs from the Romans, Persians and Turks with their language and their customary usage. For this is permitted and good when there is a need.”

So upon this are some broad comments about Hijāb’s tactic here, and then a longer discussion about the quote itself:

First: The psychology of Hijab and his thought process is to try and reframe and restrict the whole issue to one of usage of terminology alone and not about his innovated methodology condemned by the Salaf. He is bringing together two things. First, Ibn Taymiyyah’s usage and discussion of these terms throughout his books, and then this quote, which is isolated from its context. With these two affairs put together, Hijāb can then deceive his followers into thinking as to why—on the basis that this is only about usage of terminology—he is being criticised for using these terms such as *imkān*, *wujūb* and so on, when Ibn Taymiyyah does it often.

Second: Given the above, to show how deluded Hijāb is, one just needs to reflect upon the title of the book he is quoting from, “**Dar’ Ta’ārūd al-‘Aql wal-Naql**”, which means “**Repelling the [Alleged] Conflict Between Reason and Revelation.**” This book was written to refute an alleged universal principle that the people of *kalām* and *falsafah* had agreed upon and which was expressed by al-Rāzī for them. This principle is that when we see a conflict between what our reason (*‘aql*) requires (of negating Allāh’s attributes after having proving Allāh’s existence with speculative rhetoric and philosophy) and what we find in the revealed texts of affirmation of attributes, then it is reason which must take precedence, otherwise we will have

undermined our proof for Allāh’s existence.¹ Now all of the sects must operate upon this whether they are:

—The **Jahmiyyah** who argue for the origination of the universe and existence of a creator with the evidence of a’rāḍ (accidents, by which they mean attributes)

—The **Mu’tazilah** who do so through the argument of tarkīb (composition).

—The **Kullābiyyah** who do so through the argument of a’rāḍ and ḥawādith, and after them the **Ash’ariyyah** and **Mātūrīdiyyah**.

—The **Mutafalsifah** arguing for the eternity of the universe through the evidence of wujūb and imkān, by monopolising on a flaw in the argument of the Ash’arīs and those who deny Allāh’s chosen actions, thereby making the universe necessary in its existence by Allah’s existence (mūjab bil-dhāt).

So all of them must give their ‘aql, their reason (which means their specific intellectual proof for Allāh’s existence) precedence over revelation. And this means to distort the texts of the attributes.

Now Hijāb is in between the Mutafalsifah and the Mu’tazilah, and that is because he is using Ibn Sīnā’s imkān and wujūb argument, completed with the tarkīb argument of the Mu’tazilah in addition to

¹ They wrongly assumed that their innovated method was the only way to prove Allāh’s existence. So they thought that it is either case that our philosophical proof is true, or its the case that it is not. If its not, then atheism must be true, because we have no proof for the existence of a Creator. So they assumed their proof has to be truth and this in turn necessitates that negation of the attributes is what constitutes Tawḥīd, because the proof demands it. So then they embarked upon ta’īl, taḥrīf, ta’wīl and so on. This became “Tawḥīd” to them. And anyone who rejected this and affirmed the attributes and actions of Allāh, they treated him as a Mushabbih, Mujassim. When they erred in this issue, and placed the focus just on the existence of Allāh and Him being the Creator, they paved the way for Shirk to appear in the ummah, by restricting Tawḥīd in this manner. As for the Tawḥīd of the Messengers, it is single out Allāh with all forms of worship.

the takhṣīṣ argument. And this, as we explained from many citations from Ibn Taymiyyah (see Part 7) does not establish a Creator, it necessitates the rejection of a creator by logical necessity because it necessitates rejection of what He described Himself with of the ṣifāt dhātiyyah, ṣifāt khabariyyah, ṣifāt fi'liyyah and His 'uluww and His being seen on the Day of Judgement and so on. As you start being consistent and follow through with the logical necessities of these arguments, you will be led to pure atheism. The most consistent in following the logical necessities were the Mutafalsifah and the Jahmiyyah. And that's why the Salaf realised this and said about them that they deny that there is a Lord above the heavens, as is related from them. And as for the Mu'tazilah, Ash'ariyyah and Mātūrīdiyyah, then they are in contradiction. For more details refer to our paper: "**The History and Origins of the Kālām Theology of the Ash'arīs and Mātūrīdīs**" on Asharis.Com.

So the point here is that the very book that Hijāb is misquoting from to justify his misguidance after it has been made plain and clear to him, was written to refute misguided individuals just like him who entered into this ocean of misguidance.

This misguidance is necessitated upon Hijāb, and we provided empirical evidence from his debates and discussions that he is upon this misguidance. That he has not established any proof for a creator of the universe, that he has only proven a "necessary existence" (in the mind only) and that he cannot move from that to Allāh, except by negation of what has come in the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, and this will lead him back to atheism, and that when he debates with atheists or Ahl al-Kitāb who are in the know, he will be stuck.

So in other words, you start with **an existence in the mind** and when you try to establish it in outward reality, you have to actually deny it, because you will not be able to distinguish it from what is

other than it, because of the dubious, innovated language you employed from the outset. So this is **a trojan-horse**, and it leads to atheism, as we have made clear.

So Ibn Taymiyyah wrote this book in order to refute this false allegation of alleged conflict between reason and revelation and to show them that these methods are innovation and misguidance and are opposed to the Qurʾān and the Sunnah.

This means that Hijāb has to be misquoting Ibn Taymiyyah and that he does not know which celestial body he is upon, let alone which continent of the earth, he is on. He is lost. There is nothing at all in this quote for Hijāb and his misguidance. And this is known through the details to follow.

NEVER TRUST A FALSAFIYY MUTAKHABBIṬ OR JAHMI MUʿAṬṬIL WHEN HE QUOTES IBN TAYMIYYAH

Hijāb is a **falsafiyy mutakhabbiṭ** (stumbling philosopher) and such people are **prone** to misunderstanding statements. That is because they have shrewdness (dhakāʾ) but lack purity and integrity (zakāʾ) due to their bidʿah and ḍalālāh, hence, they are not given tawfiq in understanding, they are veiled from it.

If we review what is before and after this quote of Ibn Taymiyyah which Hijāb tries to use to justify his misguidance, this is what we find in actuality:

1. This statement of Ibn Taymiyyah at 1/43 of Darʾ al-Taʾarūḍ is part of an answer to a question that began on p. 26 and which is: “Is it permissible to delve into what the people have spoken about, of the issues of the foundations of religion, irrespective of whether they have been transmitted from the Prophet (صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ) or not?”

Ibn Taymiyyah says this question is stated in such a way that it has arisen from the false innovatory framework (of kalām) and this is

because it implies that there are things called “foundations of religion” (uṣūl al-dīn) that have not been transmitted from the Prophet and which people can arrive at through other means. This would imply that the Prophet neglected them or knew of them but did not explain them, and both of these are false.

2. He goes on to explain on p. 27, that the foundations of religion (uṣūl al-dīn) are either **masā’il**, that is those issues that we must believe in, and which are to be mentioned, or acted upon, such as Tawḥīd, Qadar, Prophethood, Resurrection and so on, or **dalā’il**, which are the evidences for these issues. He says that Allāh and His Messenger have sufficiently explained the masā’il in a manner that cuts off all excuses, since this is the greatest of what the Messenger conveyed and explained to the people, and through which Allāh established the proof upon His servants.

3. Then Ibn Taymiyyah says on p. 28 that it is only those of **deficient intellect and hearing** and those who enter into a portion of the saying of the people of Hellfire:

وَقَالُوا لَوْ كُنَّا نَسْمَعُ أَوْ نَعْقِلُ مَا كُنَّا فِي أَصْحَابِ السَّعِيرِ

“And they will say: ‘Had we but listened or used our intelligence, we would not have been among the dwellers of the blazing Fire!’” (67:10).

That it is only these types of people who presume that the Book and the Wisdom have not explained all of these affairs. He says that this is found frequently among the Mutafalsifah and Mutakallimah, the people of falsafah and kalām, and others.

4. As for the **dalā’il**, the evidences for these foundational matters, then factions of the people of kalām and falsafah believe that the legislation, the Qur’ān, only provides evidence through the route of

truthful khabar (reporting, narrating).² That this would be dependent upon knowledge of the truthfulness of the one relaying it (the Prophet), and then they say that knowledge of his truthfulness must depend upon rationalities (and not the Qurʾān itself, because this would be circular reasoning according to them)—and in this they erred tremendously. Rather, the truth that the Salaf are upon is that Allāh explained all such rational evidences that are needed in gaining knowledge in these affairs.³

5. Then on the next page, p. 29, Ibn Taymiyyah speaks about the errors of the people of kalām and falsafah in that they relied upon rational proofs that employ types of analogies (qiyās) which did not lead to certainties, but rather, led them to contradictions and as a result, they were overcome by bewilderment and confusion.

Then, Ibn Taymiyyah, over the next eight or so pages, goes on to give examples of the Qurʾānic method, which is to use qiyās al-awlāʾ, the loftiest example, in establishing the foundations of religion.

² What they basically mean is that the Qurʾān only contains akhbār and aḥkām, reports and rulings, and does not comprise rationalities through which one can argue against those who reject it, and if they do accept that it does contain rationalities, then they say that to use them, would be circular reasoning. In any case, since it only contains reports according to them and has come through the route of reporting, through the Prophet, then the only way we can know it is true is if we can establish that the claim of the one who brought it, the Prophet, is true, namely, that he is a genuine Prophet from Allāh.

³ In other words, the Qurʾān has come with the simplest, best, most profound rational arguments which are accessible and understandable to all people, because it is intended as guidance for all people, and not just for an elite academic few. Thus, its rationalities and arguments are superior. And in any case, using arguments that are in the Qurʾān does not count as circular reasoning, because the issue comes down to whether the argument is true or not, not where it has been stated. So the Qurʾān guides the intellects to the best of rationalities, which are true, and which were used by the Prophets and Messengers, those that cut into falsehood and get straight to the crux of the matter, and end all debate.

Then he says that in the Qur’ān and Wisdom (Sunnah) the generality of the foundations of the religion have been explained, the **masā’il** and the **dalā’il**, with such foundations that actually deserve to be called foundations, in contrast to what the people of kalām and falsafah erroneously deem to be “foundations.”

6. Then Ibn Taymiyyah says on p. 38:

“As for what some people have introduced within this meaning of falsehood—of such corrupt masā’il, issues of belief, and dalā’il, their respective evidences—then that is not from the ‘foundations of religion’ (uṣūl al-ḍīn), despite them having introduced it.”

So here, Ibn Taymiyyah is speaking about kalām, and the various philosophical ways used to prove the origination of the universe, along with the longwindedness and complexity that they involve, which are beyond the grasp of most people. So this is what Hijāb is engaged in, save that he is further in misguidance because he is using the toolset of Ibn Sīnā and the Mu‘tazilah, beyond that of the Šifāṭiyyah among the Ahl al-Kalām.

Ibn Taymiyyah says about this: “This method is from what is known by necessity that Muḥammad (صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ) did not invite people to affirm the Creator, or the prophethood of His Prophets by way of it.” He goes on to say that some people have verified that this method is a false method and that those who use it, there are only two things for them.

—Either, they will come to realise its weakness, and will then consider the evidence for the eternity of the universe to be equal to it, or they will be confused, wavering between the two views, as happened to some among them.

—Or they will adhere to the necessities arising from it which are false, such as what was held by al-Jahm bin Šafwān and some of the

heads of the Mu‘tazilah such as Abū al-Ḥudhayl al-‘Allāf (d. ~227H) of strange views.

And he mentions that the Mu‘tazilah and others, on account of these arguments, negated all of the attributes, and this led them to the saying of the creation of the Qur‘ān, rejecting Allāh being seen in the Hereafter, and His ‘uluww over His Throne and other things.

7. Ibn Taymiyyah says that all of this negation and false doctrine is what enters into “the foundations of the religion” to them and it is not at all, in reality, from the foundations of the religion that Allāh legislated for His servants.

8. Ibn Taymiyyah then goes into a brief technical discussion about terminologies, about truth (ḥaqq), falsehood (bāṭil), their necessities, what is lāzim (necessary, incumbent) and malzūm (what is made necessary, incumbent), about how evidence (dalīl) always points to what it indicates (madlūl) but that its absence does not indicate the absence of what it indicates⁴ and how this is different from a cause and effect relationship (al-‘illah wal-ma‘lūl), where in a cause that is complete necessitates its effect and the absence of the effect necessitates absence of the cause.⁵ In other words, Ibn Taymiyyah is

⁴ In other words, tracks in the desert (dalīl) indicate the person who left them (madlūl), but the absence of those tracks, if you never came across any, would not indicate the absence of that person. Similarly, this creation is evidence (dalīl) for Allāh, but the absence of this creation, prior to Allāh having created it, meaning the absence of this dalīl, is not evidence for the absence of the madlūl, the one that such an evidence would have pointed to, which is Allāh.

⁵ So this would be unlike the connection between the dalīl and madlūl, because in this case, whenever you see the effect, the cause has to be there, and if the effect is not there, the cause is not there, because of the nature of the relationship. So this applies both ways, in presence and absence, it works in reverse. Whereas the connection between dalīl and madlūl works only one way, if dalīl is absent, it does not mean the madlūl is absent. However, if the dalīl is present, then it indicates the madlūl, the thing it is pointing to, that it is present.

simply pointing out the nature of terminology and is saying that whatever has not been legislated by Allāh as religion, then its foundations cannot be traced back to the Prophet (صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ), because there is truth and what follows necessarily from truth (its “lāzim”) and there is falsehood and what follows necessarily from falsehood (its “lāzim”).

As such, since what is necessitated by that innovated kalām is falsehood, which is rejection of Allāh’s attributes, Ḥis ‘uluww, claiming the Qur’ān is created and so on, then the thing necessitating it is also falsehood, which is the kalām, and this can never be traced back to the Prophet (صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ), since he only conveyed truth. So that is the general import of this passage.

9. Within this context, Ibn Taymiyyah then says:

“As for the one who spoke the truth which Allāh permitted [for it to be said], legislatively and [for it to be used] as evidence, then he is from the people of knowledge and faith”, then he quotes the verse:

وَاللَّهُ يَقُولُ الْحَقَّ وَهُوَ يَهْدِي السَّبِيلَ

“But Allah sāys the truth, and He guides to the (Right) Way”
(33:4).

It is here that we come to the words that Ḥijāb quotes out of context. As you can see from what has preceded, Ibn Taymiyyah is actually pointing out the falsehood of this innovated, corrupt kalām, whose necessities are false, indicating it is false.

What Ibn Taymiyyah intends in the speech quoted by Ḥijāb is to make sure the reader understands specifically what type of kalām the Salaf condemned, when they spoke against kalām and its people. So Ibn Taymiyyah said on p. 43:

“As for addressing people of technical terminology with their terminology and their language, then it is not disliked when there is a

need for that and when the meanings are correct. Such as addressing the non-Arabs from the Romans, Persians and Turks with their language and their customary usage. For this is permitted and good when there is a need.”

However, Ibn Taymiyyah’s intent becomes immediately clear in the next sentence, which Hijāb—being a misguided, quotemining, innovator, on a mission to save his damaged ego—would obviously leave out, and away from the vision of his audience:

“For this reason, the Prophet (ﷺ) said to Umm Khālid bint Khālid bin Saʿīd bin al-ʿĀṣ—and she was small and had been born in the land of Abyssinia, because her father was among those who emigrated to it—he said to her: ‘O Umm Khālid, this is Sinā.’ And al-Sinā in the Abyssinian tongue means al-Ḥasan, and [he said this] because she was from the people of this language. And for that reason, the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth can be translated for the one who is in need of understanding it through translation. Likewise, a Muslim can read what he is need of from the books of the nations and their speech in their language and translate them into Arabic, just as the Prophet (ﷺ) ordered Zayd bin Thābit to learn the writing of the Jews, so that he can read it to him and write it for him, because he did not trust the Jews. Hence, the Salaf and the leading Imāms did not condemn kalām (speech) just because it contained newly arisen terminology, such as the word jawhar (substance), ʿaraḍ (accident), jism (body) and others. But rather, because the meanings being expressed through these words, in evidences and rulings, comprise such blameworthy falsehood that it is obligatory to prohibit them, because these words comprise generalised (ambiguous) meanings in (both) negation and affirmation.”

Then Ibn Taymiyyah cites from Imām Aḥmad who was refuting the Jahmiyyah, that they “speak with ambiguous speech and they deceive the ignorant people...”

Let us stop here, so we can understand what is going on before we continue.

Ibn Taymiyyah is explaining that the prohibition of kalām and the Salaf’s condemnation of it is not in relation to mere terminology alone since technical language is needed in specialisms and in arts and in professions and so on. So if a person was to enter into that, such as what we find in the sciences, that is not what is prohibited. You are not blamed for learning the technical language of engineering, for example. What the Salaf condemned is the use of language whose meanings are ambiguous and through this ambiguity they can be embedded with falsehood, which can then be applied to either affirm what is false or to reject what is true in terms of meaning, particularly when this is used in the foundations of religion.

10. Then Ibn Taymiyyah says on p. 44: “When the meanings that they intend by these expressions are known and they are weighed by the Book and the Sunnah, and whatever truth has come in the Book and the Sunnah is affirmed and whatever falsehood has been negated in the Book and the Sunnah is negated, **then this is what is the truth.** [This being] In opposition to the way traversed by the people of desires who speak with these terms in affirmation and negation in the wasā’il (means, methods) and the masā’il (subject matters), without an explanation through detailing and categorising [all affairs], which is [the way of] the Straight Path, whereas this is from the affairs that give rise to doubts. For it is not found in the speech of the Prophet (ﷺ) and nor any of the Companions, and nor any of the followed Imāms that they attached any of the foundations of the religion, neither in the masā’il or the dalā’il, to the

meanings of the word jawhar (substance), jism (body), taḥayyuz (spatial occupation), ‘araḍ (accident) and what is like that.”

So this is the way of the people of desires like Muḥammad Hijāb and the people of kalām and falsafah. In the masā’il (matters of creed) and the dalā’il (evidences used to reach them), they employ these terminologies.

Then Ibn Taymiyyah goes on to mention, on p. 45, the word jism (body) and the various definitions given to it. And then he says:

“The Salaf and the leading Imāms of the religion who rebuked and declared innovatory the speech about jawhar, jism, ‘araḍ—their speech includes rebuke of those who enter the meanings that they intend by these words into the foundations of the religion, in its dalā’il and masā’il, in affirmation and in negation.”

Now this is exactly what Hijāb is doing and what he is upon as is clear to everybody. He uses these words, “**incorporeal, immaterial, not parts, not composed, not specified, not limited**” and so on, and this is from the angle of negation, within the actual acquisition of creed from the outset. So the Salaf condemned the incorporation of this speech into creed, which is what al-Jahm and al-Ja’d did, and likewise the Mu’tazilah and the rest of the factions of kalām and the Mutafalsifāh as well and as a result of which they brought great misguidance, deviation and splitting into the ummah. So here, Hijāb enters among these people, he is under the rebuke and the condemnation of the Salaf of such people.

11. Then Ibn Taymiyyah goes on to mention the way of the People of the Sunnah, and how they clarify the truth. He says:

“As for when the correct, established meanings are known through the Book and the Sunnah and they are expressed for the one who can comprehend them through these words so that what agrees with the truth of their meanings and what opposes it becomes clear, then

this is of great benefit. It is [counted to be] from [the act of] judging by the Book between the people in that wherein they differed, as the Exalted said:

كَانَ النَّاسُ أُمَّةً وَاحِدَةً فَبَعَثَ اللَّهُ النَّبِيِّينَ مُبَشِّرِينَ وَمُنذِرِينَ وَأَنْزَلَ مَعَهُمُ الْكِتَابَ بِالْحَقِّ لِيَحْكُمَ بَيْنَ النَّاسِ فِي مَا اخْتَلَفُوا فِيهِ

‘Mankind was [of] one religion [before their deviation], then Allāh sent the prophets as bringers of good tidings and warners and sent down with them the Scripture in truth to judge between the people concerning that in which they differed.’ (2:213).

This is similar to judging between all nations by way of the Book with respect to that wherein they have differed of the meanings that they express through their conventions and customary usages. And this requires knowledge of the meanings of the Book and the Sunnah, and knowledge of the meanings of those [people] through their words, then considering [evaluating] these meanings with those meanings so that the one who is in agreement and one who is in opposition becomes apparent.” End of his speech.

So this is what the likes of Ibn Taymiyyah did himself, upon sound knowledge of the Book and the Wisdom and with knowledge of the terms that these people of kalām and falsafah were using. He judged between them with the Book and Wisdom and then after making consideration of the meanings of these words through the meanings found in the Book and the Wisdom, he separated the people who were correct from the people who were in opposition, in all the various disputes taking place between the various parties. So for example, between the Mutafalsifah and the people of kalām. Then between the Mū‘tazilah and the Ash‘arīs. Then between the Ash‘arīs and the Sālimīs. Then between the Kullābiyyah and the Mu‘tazilah,

Jahmiyyah. Then between the Karrāmiyyah and the Ash‘arīs. Then between Ahl al-Sunnah and all of these sects. So in each case, whoever had truth with him was credited with that truth and whoever was in error was declared to be in error.

So when such a person enters the field with grounding in the Book and Wisdom and in knowledge of these terms and separates truth from falsehood—after innovation, deviation, ambiguity had entered and caused confusion, differing and splitting—then this is what is of great benefit. And who are the ones who created this situation of differing, splitting, arguing and bickering?

Yes, it is the likes of al-Jahm bin Ṣafwān and Muḥammad Hījāb, who are ignoramuses, given to debating, and amazed with themselves and who enter into the masā’il and dalā’il what is not from the foundations of the religion and with speech that the Prophet (ﷺ) and the Salaf never used.

12. After this, Ibn Taymiyyah goes on to cite all those verses which condemn speaking without knowledge, disputing without knowledge, speaking about Allāh without knowledge, disputing after the truth has been made clear, disputing with falsehood to oppose truth, and which condemn splitting and differing.⁶ He treats all of these texts as comprising prohibition of kalām, the kalām that the Salaf condemned and prohibited. So the one who enters into it, then all of these verses apply to him. And Hījāb has a portion of these verses, because what he is engaged in is what Ibn Taymiyyah has indicated is prohibited by way of these verses, which are the verses on the basis of which the Salaf condemned the people of kalām from the Jahmiyyah and their offshoots.

⁶ Such as (7:33), (17:36), (7:169), (4:171), (3:66), (8:6), (40:5), (40:4), (40:35), (40:56), (42:35), (42:16), (13:13), (22:8), (3:103-106), (6:159), (30:30-32), (3:19), (11:118-119), (2:176).

13. Then we can go to other statements of Ibn Taymiyyah in which the affair is also made clear, and we will cite only one for the sake of brevity, as occurs in Bayān Talbīs al-Jahmiyyah (1/219):

أما لفظ الجسم^(١) والجوهر^(٢) والمتحيز^(٣) والعرض^(٤) والمركب^(٥) ونحوها من الألفاظ الاصطلاحية التي تكلم بها أهل الخصومات من أهل الكلام في الاستدلال بمعانيها على حدوث العالم، وإثبات الصانع، والإخبار بها عن الله نفيًا وإثباتًا، فهذا لا يعرف عن أحد من سلف الأمة وأئمتها، الذين جعلهم الله أئمة لأهل السنة والجماعة، في العلم والدين، بل المحفوظ عنهم المتواتر إنكار ذلك وذم أهله، وصرحوا في ذمه بدم هذا الكلام - الجسم والعرض - لاسيما وذمهم للجهمية الذين يتكلمون بهذا الأسلوب ونحو[هـ]^(١) في حق الله تعالى، أضعاف كلامهم وذمهم للمشبهة، لأن ضررهم أقل، فإن الله بعث الرسل بالإثبات

“As for the word **jism** (body), **jawhar** (substance), **mutaḥayyiz** (spatially occupance), **‘arad** (accident), **murakkab** (composed) and their likes from the technical terms which the people of argumentation from Ahl al-Kalām speak with when seeking—through their meanings—evidence for the origination of the universe and affirmation of a Maker, and then by [these words], informing about Allāh through negation and affirmation, then this is not known from anyone from the Salaf of the Ummah and its leading Imāms, those whom Allāh has made leading scholars for Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jamā‘ah, in knowledge and religion. Rather, what is preserved from them through large-scale transmission is rejection of that and rebuke of its people. They openly declared this rebuke of kalām—of [the terms] **jism** and **‘arad**—especially their rebuke of the Jahmiyyah who

speak with this method about Allāh and what is like it—[their rebuke in this regard] being multiple times more than their speech in rebuking the Mushabbihah, because their harm is less.”

Then Ibn Taymiyyah explains that this type of language came from the enemies of the Messengers, the Pagans and Sabean Philosophers who reversed the way of the Messengers of specific affirmation and general negation. So they turned it around and brought specific negations instead. He then illustrated with examples such as:

“He is not a jism (body), not a substance (jawhar), not an ‘araḍ (accident), not divisible (munqasim), not composed (mu’allaf, murakkab), not limited (maḥdūd), and He does not have any extremities or ends, He is not inside the universe nor outside of it, and nor this and nor that, until they negated everything that is possible for the hear to know.”

So this perfectly describes Hijāb, this is exactly what he is doing, this is the way he is upon and he uses these words, **“immaterial incorporeal, unlimited, partless, not composed, configured, particularised”** and so on which are dubious, murky terms.

As for what Ibn Taymiyyah is describing as being of “great benefit”, of analysing and verifying true meanings and separating them from false meanings, and judging between factions then this is what the People of the Sunnah do, and this is what we have been doing in analysing Hijāb’s innovations and misguidance in order to separate the Tawḥīd of the Messengers and its dalā’il from the Tawḥīd of the Philosophers and Jahmites and its innovated, toxic, trojan-horse dalā’il.

In conclusion of the above discussion about the quote:

There is nothing in the paragraph that was quoted by Hijāb from Ibn Taymiyyah that supports his bid‘ah and ḍalālah. Rather, that statement simply means that in day to day life, there is no harm in using technical language where that is needed or necessary, such as in specialisms, in arts, crafts and industries, in science, engineering and so and likewise in the customary and conventional usage that varies between nations and their languages, and likewise in the fields of translating between languages.

However what the Salaf condemned is what Hijāb does of using these philosophical terms which introduce ambiguity in the matters of creed, and in speaking of Allāh, whether in affirmation or negation.

CLOSING NOTES

We can now close this discussion, **the twelfth second of the blood choke-hold**—just as Hijāb is about to pass out, his bid‘ah and ḍalālah, all but exposed and exhausted—and make the following notes:

1. Hijāb is an unrepentant, arrogant misguided innovator, a ruling he has effectively declared upon himself through his own speech and behaviour, and has exposed himself as a vile and vicious individual who when defeated in argument, resorts to despicable, lowly means to save face and to bring down his adversary by scandalmongering and denigration. He does this by regurgitating the lies that previous haters and liars have spread about the People of Sunnah. So he seeks these affairs and presents them to his followers, out of vengeance. This is not something transmitted about past innovators, and this shows that Hijāb is a truly sick and lowly individual, a man who is all about his own ego and status, full of hatred and malice.

2. Such people, by virtue of the filth that they harbour in their souls and hearts, are not given **zakā'** (inner purity and integrity) and for that reason, despite their **dhakā'** (shrewdness) in worldly matters, in philosophy, in kalām, in the worldly sciences, they are not given tawfīq (success) by Allāh in their understandings (fuhūm) and in their sciences (ʿulūm) relating to creed. Thus, we see Hijāb continuously, again and again, failing to grasp these issues, blinded to the truth, unable to grasp what he is quoting, falling into error, contradiction and so on, and we have amply demonstrated that throughout our series. In one sentence he combines between what the Mu'tazilah consider to be tajsīm and kufr "an attribute is a part of me" and what the Mu'tazilah consider to be Tawḥīd "its intrinsic to me"—which is how the Mu'tazilah speak of Allāh's attributes, making them to be synonymous with the essence. He makes the Qur'ān eternal and does not distinguish between what is eternal (qadīm al-naw') in its genus with respect to the attribute of speech and what depends on Allāh's will in its individual instances (hādith al-āḥād), and then he makes the Qur'ān eternal in the Preserved Tablet. He negates jism from Allāh and then speaks with a jism for Allāh, upon the laws of his kalām jurisdiction, by declaring his "necessary existence" to be greater in size (and mass) than Julie the physicist's fundamental particle, the muon. He says Allāh is "partless" and elsewhere he says speech is "a part of Allāh". So this man is **a clown, an intellectual spastic** who has not been given zakā', and so he stumbles and fumbles. And if this the case of the one being followed, this social media personality and actor, then what do you think is the case of the followers who are rushing blindly to his defence? These are the types of people which are going to be fodder for the Dajjāl and we greatly fear for them, may Allāh protect them and grant them success in arriving at real knowledge and acquiring true guidance and may He

save them from the clutches of performance artists, clowns, jokers, chameleons and wannabes like Hijāb.

3. Anyone who makes kalām and falsafah to be his foundation and leaves the acquisition of fiqh (understanding) and baṣīrah (insight) from the Book and the Wisdom will be veiled from understanding truths and realities as a consequence of his departure from the sources of truth. Look at what happened to the likes of al-Ghazālī (d. 505H) and al-Rāzī (d. 606H) who spent their lives on the oceans of kalām and falsafah and all it did was to leave them in utter confusion. They wished, at the end of their lives, if only they had been upon the simple religion of old, barren women, the dīn of fiṭrah, those who had better knowledge of them in Tawḥīd. They had realised that there is no true benefit in the goods of kalām and falsafah, they are toxic, faulty goods that do not reach the objective, and cause confusion, and bewilderment.

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